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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION -  
OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE CAUSED BY SHIPS  
1.1 Introduction 
‘Millions of organisms will suffer and die an agonising death every year as a 
result of the lethal effects of oil pollution and man himself may ultimately 
suffer the consequences of his indifference to the destruction of the 
environment.'1 
         - Paul Dempsey 
This powerful statement captures the inevitable realities associated 
with marine oil pollution. In this context, this dissertation adopts an 
anthropocentric approach in the examining of the respective civil liability 
regimes in place to address pollution caused by the accidental discharge of 
oil by ships. This approach focuses on the needs of people that are provided 
for by the environment through ecosystem goods and services. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse and compare the 
International and the South African civil liability regimes on oil pollution 
damage caused by ships. This comparative analogy will be done with the 
view of ascertaining whether the legal regime of South Africa (SA) is in line 
with the international civil liability regime and to ascertain what 
improvements can be made to SA’s civil liability regime. During this analysis, 
any inadequacies identified in these regimes will be addressed briefly.  
In December 2013, SA updated and revised its domestic marine pollution 
laws with a series of amendment laws as outlined in Chapter 3 below.  
These aim to update and align SA’s domestic legal regime with the 
international civil liability regime. This dissertation serves to explore these 
laws against the backdrop of the relevant International Conventions including 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which provides a 
general framework. Prior to these amendment laws, SA’s regime was 
outdated and provided insufficient compensation for a major oil spill. 
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Oil-fouled beaches, dying seabirds and severe economic loss from the 
closure of fishing grounds and holiday resorts is the picture painted by oil 
spills, and these consequences often arouse public outrage.2 Oil spills cause 
extensive damage to the marine environment and to human society.3 Indeed, 
the economic consequences are often extensive, and it is for this reason that 
the internationalisation of a civil liability regime for oil pollution damage was 
initially proposed.4 The first move towards an international civil liability 
regime came when states which were affected by an unprecedented oil spill 
made it clear that individual states could not cope alone with these negative 
effects.5 The tanker held responsible for the oil spill which has been 
described as ‘the greatest peace-time menace ever to have confronted 
Britain’s shores’ was Liberian-registered tanker, the Torrey Canyon.6 
 
1.3 The Development of the International Regime 
 
On Saturday, 18 March 1967, the Torrey Canyon was en route to 
Milford Haven with a full cargo of 119 328 tonnes of crude Kuwaiti oil.7 Her 
Italian master, anxious not to miss high tide at Milford Haven, attempted a 
short-cut between Seven Stones and the Scilly Isles and misjudged his 
position, causing the Torrey Canyon to run aground Pollard Rock.8 
Approximately 30 000 tonnes of oil spilled at the time of the grounding, a 
further 20 000 tonnes spilled during the following seven days of high seas 
and gale force winds until 26 March when the ship’s back was broken on the 
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rocks, releasing a further 50 000 tonnes.9 Drifting oil polluted the beaches of 
Brittany, France and the Channel Islands.10 Prevailing winds at the time 
caused a ripple effect of oil pollution that was eventually felt in at least six 
countries; this exemplified the scale of the problem of marine pollution.11 The 
situation was further complicated by uncertainty as to which jurisdiction and 
law would be applicable in this unique case of accidental oil pollution.12 The 
Torrey Canyon was registered in Liberia, owned by a Bermudian company 
whose officers resided in New York; she had been on a time-charter to a US 
oil company which, in turn, had sub-chartered her to a Britain oil company for 
the fateful voyage.13 There was, furthermore, considerable uncertainty 
surrounding a state’s right to intervene in such an incident.14  
 
This is a tale of political conflict, of commercial tensions between the 
shipping, oil and insurance industries, and, finally, of grave economic and 
ecological damage.15 The seabirds were the worst sufferers of the oil 
pollution, with total casualties estimated to be 20 000 guillemots and 5 000 
razor bills.16 In a study, a Plymouth laboratory found that the oil, apart from 
the serious effects on seabirds, was not lethal to flora and fauna of the 
marine environment.17  The detergents used by the British government to 
disperse oil during the clean-up of oil-fouled beaches, however, proved to be 
highly toxic to marine life.18 Studies show that as little as one part of 
detergent per million parts of seawater is lethal to planktonic growth.19 The 
legal uncertainties translated into confusion and left the British government 
overwhelmed and severely criticised. The estimated cost to the British 
government, excluding the ecological damage, was three million pounds.20 
The French government had a less chaotic experience than that of the 
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British because they had more time to prepare, and they had also learned 
from the mistakes made by Britain.21 The French banned detergents and 
used powdered chalk to get rid of the oil and this was less detrimental to the 
marine environment.22 In retrospect, the estimated number of expenses 
incurred globally was 14 million pounds.23 After considerable difficulties in 
obtaining compensation from the owners of the Torrey Canyon (who initially 
denied liability), the British government detained one of the Torrey Canyon’s 
sister ships which was released only in exchange for a three million pound 
security.24 The French followed suit and, eventually, after protracted 
negotiations, the owners settled out of court with three million pounds to be 
divided between the United Kingdom, Guernsey and France.25  
 
The Torrey Canyon incident raised a number of issues, including the 
issue of civil liability. Many questions remained unanswered and, 
accordingly, there was a call for the international regulation of the complex 
issues of civil liability and compensation, and the states affected by the 
Torrey Canyon disaster were at the forefront of the requests for assistance. 
Consequently, the world and the international community began to address 
the problem more vigorously.26 There is little doubt that the international 
regime on oil pollution received its impetus from the Torrey Canyon disaster 
which highlighted various legal problems.27 
 
Up until the Torrey Canyon incident, the protection of the marine 
environment from pollution was fairly undeveloped in terms of international 
law.28 As a result, states were left with wide discretion with regard to 
polluting the oceans.29 According to Tanaka, this was owing to a general lack 
of awareness of environmental protection.30 This meant that victims of oil 
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spills had to rely on ordinary fault-based liability.31 Apart from it being 
extremely difficult to prove fault in such cases, jurisdictional uncertainty 
arising from the international nature of oil transportation made it practically 
impossible for victims to obtain justice.32 In the 1960s, however, the 
introduction of supertankers increased the chances of major shipping 
disasters, and the Torrey Canyon was the unfortunate supertanker which 
caused the international law to develop into the comprehensive marine 
pollution regime which exists today.33 Other shipping disasters such as the 
Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez, Erika and the Prestige also had an influence 
on the international regime and are dealt with in Chapter 2 below. 
 
At the very beginning, and of paramount importance, is the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which is known 
as the “framework” or ”umbrella” convention in the international law of the 
sea and which is dealt with at the beginning of Chapter 2 below. The 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) to address pollution 
prevention, the 1969 Intervention Convention to deal with emergency 
response, the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (1969 CLC), and the 1971 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (1971 Fund convention) were enacted after the Torrey Canyon 
disaster, once it was clear that the international regime was not sufficient to 
deal with such an immense oil spill.34 The 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund 
convention were then substantially amended by the 1992 protocols of 
amendment.35 This regime was then further developed after certain gaps 
were identified in its application, and when it was realised that there was a 
need to extend the scope of the substances which were covered 
internationally. In 1996, the International Convention on Liability and 
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Compensation for Damage in connection with the carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious substances by Sea (the HNS convention) was enacted to account 
for pollution by hazardous substances other than oil.36 The International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunkers 
convention) was then enacted in 2001, and it extends the international 
regime to bunker (fuel) oil.37 Bunker oil is the oil that is used, or intended to 
be used, for the operation or propulsion of the ship and the residue of such 
oil.38  
 
All of the above respective conventions aim to adopt uniform 
international rules with regard to adequate liability and compensation; the 
Bunkers convention then goes even further and reaffirms the international 
duties imposed by articles 194 and 235 of UNCLOS, the framework 
convention with standardised rules on the international law of the sea, 
intended to bring uniformity.39 The aforementioned articles of UNCLOS 
respectively provide that states shall take measures to prevent, reduce, and 
control pollution, as well as, co-operate in the further development of the 
international rules providing for adequate compensation for pollution damage 
(own emphasis).40 
 
1.4 The South African Civil Liability Regime 
 
 About 6 000 nautical miles south of Pollard rock, which was struck by 
the Torrey Canyon in 1967, lays the Cape of Good Hope, SA. The route that 
runs through the Cape of Good Hope is one of the busiest oil tanker routes 
in the world and this contributes to the large volume of oil traffic in this 
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route.41 The Cape of Good Hope is also known as the  ‘Cape of Storms’ and  
many vessels have faltered off this hazardous coastline of SA.42   
 In 1983, the Castillo del Bellver, a Spanish supertanker and one of the 
largest tankers lost in South African waters, ran aground about 14 nautical 
miles offshore of Saldanha Bay, Western Cape. The Castillo broke in half, 
spilling 175 000 tonnes of crude oil, which subsequently ignited. After a 
rescue mission was conducted, the remains of the Castillo were towed 300 
miles out to sea where it was allowed to sink to a depth of approximately 3 
000 metres.43 
More recently, in 1994, an iron ore carrier known as the Apollo Sea 
broke up in heavy seas close to Cape Town, spilling 2 400 tonnes of heavy 
bunker fuel oil.44 The devastating consequences included oil contaminated 
beaches that took months to clean, 7 500 seabirds that had to be rescued 
and cleaned, and a further 1 500 birds were known to have died from oil 
contamination.45 The cost of the clean-up operation which followed the 
Apollo Sea disaster was R27 million.46 Since then there have been countless 
other major oil spill incidents, including the Treasure which sank in the year 
2000 near Melkbosstrand, Cape Town.47 
 
Undoubtedly, the effects of oil pollution on the marine environment are 
catastrophic, and the costs to rectify the devastation are immense. 
Notwithstanding the fact that pollution damage is often irreversible and full 
rectification might not be possible even where funds are made available. In 
addition, oil spills have a major impact on industries such as fisheries, 
aquaculture and tourism.48  Experience confirms that hotels, shops, 
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 Glazewski J “Pollution of Marine and Coastal Waters” in Environmental Law in South 
Africa (2013) 25-3. 
43
 Glazewski (n42) (2013) 25-5. 
44
 “PEOPLE AND THE COAST: POLLUTION” 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/EnvironmentalResourceManagement/publications/Documen
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restaurants and other tourist establishments suffer both a loss of demand 
and a loss of income as a result of reduced tourism.49  It has, furthermore, 
been accepted in some cases that even establishments outside the area 
directly affected by the oil spill could suffer economic losses from the oil 
spill.50 All coastal states should, therefore, strive towards attaining a 
comprehensive civil liability regime for marine oil pollution damage. 
 
1.4.1 South African Marine Pollution Legislation 
 
As elaborated in Chapter 3 below, SA gave effect to the 1969 CLC and 
the 1971 Fund convention by enacting the Marine Pollution (Control and Civil 
Liability) Act 6 of 1981 (MPA)(own emphasis).  SA, however, only acceded 
to the 1992 protocols of amendment on 1 October 2005 (own emphasis) 
and, subsequently, did not implement these amendments domestically.51 
Eight years later, the government finally updated the domestic law by 
providing for the domestic enactment of the provisions as contained in the 
1992 protocols. In December 2013 (own emphasis), the Merchant Shipping 
(Civil Liability Convention) Act 25 of 2013 (“MSCLC act”), the Merchant 
Shipping (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) Act 24 of 2013 
(“the IOPC act”), the Merchant Shipping (International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund) Administrations Act 35 of 2013 (“Administrations act”), 
and the Merchant Shipping (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) 
Contributions Act 36 of 2013 (“Contributions act”) was enacted by 
Parliament.  
 
The acts were then signed into law by the President, and the 
commencement dates are listed as 30 May 2014 for the MSCLC Act and the 
IOPC Fund Act, and 1 May 2014 for the Administrations Act and the 
                                                          
49








Contributions Act.52 These Acts seek to bring SA’s liability regime into line 
with the international liability regime.   
 
1.5 Legal Problem 
 
Now that the origin and development of the international and South 
African civil liability regimes have been addressed, the legal problem of this 
dissertation may be understood more clearly.  
 
In August 2013, public hearings were held in the process of enactment 
of the recent marine pollution laws.53 The Maritime Law Association of SA 
(the “MLA”) announced that, as matters stood, SA would be terribly exposed 
in the event of a major oil spill, given the low limits of liability contained in the 
MPA.54 The MLA further declared that it is simply imperative that both the 
1992 CLC and the Fund Convention are given force of law as soon as is 
reasonably possible so as to ensure that SA’s limits of liability are increased 
from the unacceptably low levels contained in the MPA and to ensure a 
claimant's access to the 1992 Fund.55 The words of the MLA clearly illustrate 
the urgency of the long awaited and heightened protection that the recent 
marine oil pollution Acts should bring about. This liability regime is of great 
importance to victims whose livelihoods could be instantly destroyed by a 
single oil spill incident. It is, moreover, essential to ensure that there are 
sufficient funds to deal with the catastrophic environmental damage and 
degradation caused by oil spills.  The legal problem explored in this 
dissertation relates, therefore, to the adequacy of SA’s regime and the 
identification of its inadequacies by comparing it with the predominantly 
successful international regime. 
 
                                                          
52
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Just as the Torrey Canyon identified legal gaps in the international law, 
subsequent tanker accidents have identified legal problems in the existing 
international regime. These problems will be discussed briefly during the 
analysis of the international regime in Chapter 2, and, since the South 
African civil liability regime is directly based on the international regime, the 
possible inadequacies will also be of significance for SA’s regime.  
 
1.6 Research Aim and Questions 
 
 The main aim of this dissertation is to assess the adequacy of the 
South African civil liability regime applicable to oil pollution caused by 
tankers and to ensure that these are aligned with its international obligations 
in particular the various civil liability conventions outlined in Chapter 2. In so 
doing accurate solutions to any inadequacies that are identified are 
proposed. To achieve this aim, it will be necessary to analyse the newly-
enacted marine pollution laws and ascertain how these affect the South 
African legal regime. 
 
 The primary research question of this dissertation is: Is SA’s civil 
liability regime consistent with, aligned with and adequate in light of, the 




 In order to answer the abovementioned research question, this 
dissertation adopts the following structure: It is divided into five chapters 
which will follow one another as the civil liability regime is being unpacked 
and analysed.  
 
 This Chapter 1 includes an introduction, background, and sets out the 
scope and limits of this topic; It furthermore provides a brief literature review 




 In Chapter 2 it will be beneficial to look at the brief history behind the 
international regulation of marine oil pollution in order to grasp the reasoning 
behind the existing international regime. Therefore, the international history 
will first be addressed, and thereafter a comprehensive analysis of the 
various conventions that make up the international regime will be done. 
There will also be an indication of certain inadequacies which may be 
contained therein, before concluding and moving  the focus to SA in the next 
chapter. 
 
 It will then be of importance to address SA’s liability regime critically. In 
Chapter 3 the new marine pollution acts are dissected whilst keeping in mind 
the broad themes that originate in the international conventions. This third 
chapter also addresses whether the MSCLC act has strengthened the South 
African regime and whether SA will have access to the compensation funds 
after the enactment of the IOPC Fund Act.  
 
 Chapter 4 will accordingly look at the laws of general application in SA 
with a view of ascertaining how these laws complement the civil liability 
regime and how reliance on them could improve the South African regime. 
Furthermore, recommendations will be made with regards to improving SA’s 
regime. 
 
 Finally, this dissertation will come to a conclusion in Chapter 5 which 




 A desktop study method was used to conduct research for this 
dissertation which included a comprehensive textual analysis of domestic 
legislation, international conventions and current news articles. Political 






1.9 Literature Review on Civil Liability 
 
 A brief introduction to civil liability is helpful to set a context for the 
following chapters. Civil liability is governed in SA by the law of delict, which 
is known as tort law in European legal systems. For purposes of this 
dissertation, the common law of delict will be looked at due to the fact that 
there is a focus on SA. The law of delict falls under private law and is part of 
the law of obligations.56 In terms of a delictual obligation, the ‘wrongdoer’ has 
a personal duty to compensate the victim for the harm caused, and, similarly, 
the victim has a personal right to claim reparation of harm done from the 
wrongdoer.57  Owing to the growth of industrialisation and the environmental 
risks associated with it, it is important to have a delictual system in place 
which designates liable parties for potential damages caused by harmful 
activities such as oil pollution from ships. Such a delictual system is provided 
for in a global civil liability regime. 
 
 Boberg broadly defines a delict as a civil wrong.58 More narrowly, Van 
der Walt and Midgley define it as wrongful and blameworthy conduct which 
causes harm to a person.59 In general, the delictual elements must be 
satisfied for a claim to be successful. These are an act/omission, 
wrongfulness, causation, fault, and harm/damage.60 Gleaning from this brief 
overview, it is clear the civil liability is very private in nature, whilst 
international matters fall under public law. The use of a civil liability regime 
for oil pollution which is inevitably an international act is, therefore, unusual 
but is nonetheless accounted for by the various principles that make up the 
law of delict. The various elements of delict including intent, strict liability and 
causality underlie both international liability conventions, as well as, 
domestic law giving effect to such liability regimes and these are elaborated 
on in Chapter 2 below. 
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 A special form of liability has been adopted to govern oil pollution 
matters and this is strict liability. Strict liability imposes automatic liability on 
the defendant without the necessity of proof of fault.61 It is a deviation from 
the underlying principle of delict that fault is imperative to found liability. It 
expresses a different morality in that society determines that the nature of, or 
risk associated with, the conduct is such that the responsible person should 
compensate anyone who suffers harm as a result of the conduct.62 The basis 
of this liability has developed primarily through modern legislation which 
concerns activities which involve a considerable risk of harm.63 Pollution 
impairs private interests where a subject is damaged through the 
environmental media, i.e. material pollution of the sea water.64 This in turn 
warrants compensation of damage to individuals from polluters.65 It is, 
however, noted at the outset that in this instance an anthropocentric 
approach to environmental damage is adopted. Therefore the focus of this 
dissertation will be on the effect of the environmental damage on the lives of 




It is apparent that the South African civil liability and compensation 
regime for many years lagged behind its international law obligations. By 
domesticating the relevant conventions, however, the first step has been 
taken towards closing this gap. In order to assess SA’s regime in the light of 
the international legal regime, it is necessary, firstly, to analyse 
comprehensively the international regime which will be done in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION REGIME FOR 
OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE CAUSED BY SHIPS 
2.1 Introduction 
“It is a curious situation that the sea, from which life first arose, should now be 
threatened by the activities of one form of that life. But the sea, though 
changed in a sinister way, will continue to exist; the threat is rather to life 
itself.”  
      - Rachel Carson, The Sea Around Us 
The above quotation illustrates the interconnection between man and 
the sea, between the activities of man and damage to the sea, and between 
the existence of the ocean and the existence of man. This chapter will 
address the international civil liability regime with the view to clarifying what 
recourse is available to victims of oil spills in line with the anthropocentric 
approach taken in this dissertation. It must, however, be acknowledged that 
the protection of the sea itself (biocentrism) is also of importance for the lives 
of human beings in general, not only as an apparent source of food, but as 
well as for its aesthetic value.  
 
The international oil pollution civil liability regime is seen as a “precedent for 
several conventional regimes governing liability for transnational 
environmental damage”.66 It is accepted by a countless number of authors 
that the Torrey Canyon disaster is what set in motion the process that led to 
the adoption of this regime which has come to be known as both 
revolutionary and comprehensive.67 The Torrey Canyon alerted the thinking 
of legislators and brought to the surface glaring legal impracticalities, and it 
is therefore, associated with the inception of national and international efforts 
to improve the regime governing liability for oil pollution.68 This chapter will 
therefore seek to explore this comprehensive international regime and make 
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an assessment of its effectiveness. Before, however, divulging the 
international regime, it is important to look at the law of delict and its 
relationship with pollution which follows hereon. 
 
2.1.1 The Interrelation between Pollution and the Law of Delict 
 
 As mentioned in paragraph 1.9 above, the relation between the law of 
delict and pollution control is worth exploring. The common law of delict is an 
imperative branch of law as it underlies contemporary pollution control law.69 
In order for liability to arise on the part of an ‘environmental wrongdoer’ the 
five elements of delict must be satisfied:- there must be an act or omission 
on the part of a person, which act or omission is wrongful and causes harm 
or damage to another person or property due to such respective person’s 
fault (own emphasis). For example, in the context of environmental pollution, 
the spillage of a harmful substance may be an unlawful and thus wrongful 
act that causes harm, however, causation always proves to be a difficult 
element to satisfy and there is an inherent difficulty in placing a monetary 
value on the environment in order to prove loss or damages.70 Therefore, 
environmental statutory provisions have modified, refined and/or erased 
some of these elements71 in relation to environmental pollution. Each of 
these elements will now be dealt with below in the context of pollution and 
pollution control. 
 
2.1.1.1 An Act or Omission 
 As stated above, the spillage of a harmful substance such as oil would 
constitute an act, however, the controversy comes in with regards to an 
omission and whether acts of omission in the environmental context such as 
failure to check a stop-cock which results in a toxic spill, constitutes a delict. 
Glazewski confirms that the matter is considered to be settled in that an act 
of omission will constitute a delict only where there is a legal duty to act.72 
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Therefore failure to act when there is a legal duty imposed to act will 
constitute an act of omission and satisfy this delictual element. Liability for an 
act of omission is, however, more restricted as the law is generally reluctant 
to impose such duties.73 
 
2.1.1.2 Wrongfulness 
 The test for wrongfulness is known as the “boni mores” test and 
assesses wrongfulness based on the legal convictions of the community and 
what is considered to be objectively reasonable from case to case. Thus, an 
act is wrongful if it violates the legal duty to take care, and/or results in an 
unjustified infringement of the legally protected interests of another.74 
Establishing wrongfulness may seem easy enough, however, it must be 
borne in mind that there may be certain infringements which may be justified 
which is why this test is somewhat inexact.75  
 
 A fine example by Glazewski to illustrate such an instance in which a 
wrongful act may be justified is the generation of pollutants which may be 
necessitated and thus allowed as a legitimate economic activity.76 Various 
factors should be considered to determine the objective reasonableness of 
an infringement, including but not limited to: 
 
 The nature and extent of the harm caused; 
 The value of the loss to the aggrieved person and/or society; 
 The cost and effort of mitigation 
 Other economic considerations; and 
 A defence in statutory authority (which if existent, renders the act in 
question reasonable and justifiable).77 
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 Fault refers to the general blameworthiness of a person which justifies 
such a person being legally reprimanded. This element contains two sub-
elements, namely, intention and negligence.78 In the context of pollution, we 
are mainly concerned with the element of negligence and whether a person 
acted negligently in the running of his/her operations which as a result 
causes pollution and/or whether a person acted negligently where there was 
a legal duty on such person to take reasonable care.79  
 
 The test for negligence is known as the ‘reasonable person test’ and 
determines whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant: - 
(a) would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring 
another’s person or property and causing such person patrimonial loss; and 
(b) would have take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; 
- where the defendant failed to take such steps.80 
 
 Applying such a test to environmental matters may prove to be 
inherently difficult. The impracticalities associated with proving that the 
consequences of a particular act would result in pollution damage, is what 
makes environmental liability claims so complex.81 This is therefore, 
addressed in certain environmental legislation, such as in the case of oil 
pollution damage whereby the 1969 CLC provides for strict liability on the 
part of polluter and not the traditional fault-based liability. Strict liability thus 
has the effect of labelling the activity itself, one which is harmful to the 
environment and from which liability will ensue in ordinary cases where 
damage is caused. This does not, however, mean that there is unqualified 
and unrestricted liability and naturally, there are still other general provisions 
and limitations to liability which may apply. 
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2.1.1.4 Harm or Damage 
 This element of delict deals with the compensation of victims for the 
harm they have suffered.82 In the context of environmental pollution, this 
poses two problems: 
(a) The inherent difficulty of placing a monetary value on environmental 
harm83; and 
(b) The underlying premise of compensating a victim is to place them in 
the position they were in before the harm has occurred, however, it is 
clear that such a position is often impossible in environmental 
pollution cases as the damage may be irreversible. 
In general, there is a distinction between ‘patrimonial or monetary loss’ and 
‘non-patrimonial loss’.84 In the environmental pollution context, an oil 
pollution victim will generally have a claim for patrimonial loss for loss or 
damage caused to his property, however, he/she might also have suffered 
mental distress from the pollution incident.85 In the common law and South 
African context however, the claims for patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss 
are under founded under two different actions and a pollution victim may 
then have to claim monetary loss under the acquilian action and non-
patrimonial loss under the actio inijuriarum.86 It must, however, be noted that 
there are still restrictions and limitations in terms of who may recover for 
pollution damage (the type of damage recoverable) and the ultimate 
quantum of damages that may be claimed.87 
 
2.1.1.5 Causation 
 Finally, this element consists of two sub-elements, namely, factual 
causation and legal causation. In the environmental context, the 
consequential damages are often far-reaching and in some instances the 
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damages are unforeseen damages.88 It is important to note that a polluter is 
not liable simply because his actions caused harm, there must also be legal 
causation to limit situations of remoteness.89 There is no general unanimity 
by the authorities regarding the test for remoteness90 and this dissertation 
doesn’t serve to delve into these delictual elements into detail save for 
providing a general overview and highlighting the interrelation between the 
law of delict and pollution. 
 Now that an overview of the law of delict has been provided, we may 
now begin the analysis of the international regime which starts with the 




The international oil pollution civil liability was showcased in the 1969 
CLC, which was later amended by a protocol in 1992 (the 1992 CLC).91 The 
system provided for in the 1969 CLC represented a radical change from the 
international norm at the time.92 The most extraordinary element it contained 
was the concept of imposing strict liability on the ship owner, which, in 
essence, gives effect to the ‘polluter pays’ principle.93 Consequently, the 
burden of proof was shifted from victims to owners in the shipping industry, 
which speaks to the underlying premise on which the regime is based, which 
is a strengthening of the compensation payable to the victims suffering loss 
or damage from oil spills.94 It is important to note, however, that shipowners 
do not incur unlimited liability.95 The 1969 CLC limits ship owners’ liability to 
certain stipulated amounts.96 The other unique element that this regime 
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contains is that of compulsory insurance or financial security.97 Lastly, the 
negotiations which lead to the adoption of the 1969 CLC called for the 
establishment of an additional fund which was done through the Convention 
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1971 (1971 Fund Convention).98 The purpose of the 1971 
Fund Convention is to provide additional compensation to victims where 
there is inadequate compensation available to them in terms of the 1969 
CLC.99 
 
As global industrialisation boomed, the world began to hunger after the 
fuels necessary to satisfy its demanding appetite.100 This inevitably meant an 
increase in the size and volume of tankers and of hazardous cargoes-in-
transit.101  The capacity of the oceanic highways was being tested, and the 
years to come saw ‘mother nature’ unleash her wrath on various unfortunate 
vessels.102  In addition, various vessels fall victim to accidents owing to the 
failure of their man-made parts. One of the ill-fated vessels was the Amoco 
Cadiz which carried 220 000 tonnes of crude oil and suffered a failure of her 
hydraulic steering gear off the Brittany coast in 1978.103 The Amoco Cadiz 
was significant as it revealed the insufficiency of the limits prescribed in both 
the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund Convention.104 In the light of this, the 1969 
CLC was amended by protocols in 1976 and 1992.105 The 1971 Fund 
Convention was also amended in 1992.106 Once again, international efforts 
were triggered by the occurrence of a major oil spill disaster.  
 
This is not the end of the chronicle as more incidents had to occur 
before it was realised that further international action had to be taken. 
Various oil pollution disasters struck after 1992, but it was particularly the 
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Erika in 1999 and the Prestige in 2002 which became the driving forces 
behind the addition of an extra tier to the oil pollution liability regime.107 
Subsequently, the Protocol of 2003 to amend the International Convention 
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1992 (Supplementary Fund Protocol) was adopted.108 The 
Supplementary Fund Protocol is a voluntary system that increases the total 
amount of compensation available per incident of oil pollution damage.109 
The current regime consists of the 1992 CLC, the 1992 International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 Fund Convention) and the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol.110 
 
On another plane, negotiations concerning a general framework 
convention for the international law of the sea were also taking place.111 This 
framework emerged from three conferences held at specific times with the 
first one beginning in 1958 and the last one ending in 1982.112 The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) was the result of 
these negotiations.113 The UNCLOS also brought about innovative changes 
to the international law of the sea. This dissertation will address it as the 
broad framework within which all other conventions relating to the law of the 
sea must operate. 
 
2.3 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
(UNCLOS) 
 
In general, the UNCLOS is regarded as the ‘most comprehensive 
environmental treaty in existence’.114 More significantly, it symbolises a 
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major highpoint in the development of the legal regime relating to marine 
pollution.115 When compared with its antecedent conventions, it is clear that 
Part XII of the UNCLOS, concerning the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, introduces positive, fundamental transformations to the 
international law of the sea.116  
 
On the contrary, certain provisions contained in the UNCLOS are often 
referred to as ‘ambiguous’ and ‘vague’.117 According to Franckx, this is not 
attributed to poor draftsmanship, but was rather the result of its being 
purposely drafted in such a manner so as to reflect the only compromise 
among all the parties involved.118 At the time, there were growing 
environmental concerns, and the interests of shipping states and coastal 
states often collided.119 In response to this state of affairs many novel 
concepts were established.120  
 
As time goes by, however, and environmental studies are furthered, 
there are more in depth analyses of the environmental provisions in 
UNCLOS, and it is recognised that the law is constantly developing.121 
Specifically in the marine pollution context, it has been illustrated how 
various shipping accidents prompted international law to develop and be 
updated. On this note, the coming into force of the UNCLOS is certainly a 
major achievement for the international community of states, but, at the 
same time, it should not be considered to be a final document leaving no 
room for further developments.122 The significance of the UNCLOS is 
accurately described by Boyle as a fundamental shift from a power to protect 
the environment to a duty to protect it.123 Certain relevant provisions of the 
UNCLOS will now be examined. 
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2.3.1 General duties 
 
The break-through development for international environmental law is 
contained in Article 192. Article 192 places a general obligation on states to 
protect and preserve the environment. The UNCLOS is the first treaty that 
explicitly conferred this duty on states.124 Another important broad obligation 
is that states must take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution from any source, and to do so with the best practicable 
means available to them.125 States should, furthermore, “endeavour” to 
harmonise their policies in this regard.126 These articles go further than 
merely establishing a primary duty of states in marine environmental 
matters; they provide the foundation of a more complex and wide-ranging 
structure of powers and duties that cover various facets within marine 
pollution matters.127  
 
The next obligation on states is derived from customary international law and 
calls on states to ensure that activities under their control do not cause 
pollution damage to other states and their environment.128 Where the 
occurrence of an incident results in pollution, states must ensure that the 
pollution does not spread beyond their respective area of national 
jurisdiction.129 This obligation against transboundary pollution has been 
confirmed as a duty under customary international law in numerous cases 
including the Trail Smelter case.130 To this effect, states must take measures 
which include, inter alia, those designed to minimise pollution from vessels, 
in particular measures for preventing accidents and dealing with 
emergencies and the regulation of the design, construction, equipment, 
operation and manning of vessels.131 
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2.3.2 The prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
 
In the light of the various duties to regulate, minimise and eradicate 
pollution it is important to reproduce the definition of marine pollution 
provided in the UNCLOS. This definition is regarded as comprehensive and 
all-encompassing and has accordingly made its way into various other 
source-specific treaties.132 Article 1 defines “pollution of the marine 
environment” as:  
 
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into 
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to 
result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, 
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing 
and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea 
water and reduction of amenities. 
 
A closer analysis of this definition reveals that it consists of both an 
ecocentric and an anthropocentric approach. It takes into account ecological 
factors and the need to ensure that marine ecosystems are not altered in 
any way, and, on the other hand, it acknowledges humanity’s use of the sea 
and its resources. In addition, it is an open definition which includes all 
sources of marine pollution, which means both existing and new sources.133 
This leaves room for developments outside of the six sources identified in 
the UNCLOS.134 It is, therefore, within this context that the duties specific to 
marine pollution must be applied.  
 
As mentioned, article 194(1) of the UNCLOS obliges states to take all 
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution from any 
source and to do so with the best practicable means available to them. This 
is important in the context of marine pollution as it marks a move away from 
the permissive power to regulate pollution, which was the position prior to 
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the UNCLOS where states were left with a wide discretion to pollute the 
oceans. The powers and duties relating to marine pollution from ships may, 
however, be stricter than “generally accepted international standards” which 
indicates that some discretion of states is still present.135 This provision 
allows states to enact laws that are more stringent than international laws. 
 
2.3.3 Responsibility and liability 
 
Article 235 of the UNCLOS is a key provision for matters concerning 
liability for marine (oil) pollution incidents and is dealt with hereafter. Boyle 
argues that it comes into play upon breach of the general duties to protect 
the marine environment. The significance of article 235 is that it imposes 
state responsibility where there is damage to the marine environment 
‘unconnected to loss or damage to the interests or environment of other 
states’.136  
 
Article 235(1) provides that states are responsible for the fulfilment of 
their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment.137 States shall be liable in accordance with 
international law and must ensure that recourse is available within their legal 
systems for compensation and other relief in respect of pollution damage 
caused by their nationals.138 With the objective of assuring prompt and 
adequate compensation in respect of all damage caused by pollution of the 
marine environment, article 235(3) obliges states to cooperate in the 
implementation of existing international law and the further development of 
international law relating to liability in this field.139 Article 235 adds a new 
dimension to the duties of states regarding liability and compensation for the 
pollution of the marine environment. It clarifies the duty of states to fulfil their 
international obligations and to implement domestic laws regarding liability 
and compensation. 
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2.3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The general obligations in the UNCLOS both develop and confirm the 
customary international law on the law of the sea. The UNCLOS, 
furthermore, sets out a general framework for marine pollution caused by 
ships/vessels. The various provisions on marine pollution in the UNCLOS 
are amongst the most innovative changes brought about to the international 
law of the sea. As a whole, the UNCLOS represents a fundamental shift from 
the permissive power of states to regulate pollution to a primary duty on 
states to protect the marine environment and to reduce and control pollution. 
SA ratified the UNCLOS on 23 December 1997, and many of its provisions 
are incorporated in The Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994.140 It is now of 
importance to address the conventions that add flesh to the general rights 
and duties concerning liability provided for in the UNCLOS. It will also be 
necessary to assess the progression of these conventions. 
 
2.4 The Catalytic Torrey Canyon which gave rise to the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (1969 CLC) 
 
The International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage was 
convened in Brussels from 10 to 29 November 1969 in order to formulate a 
new international regime for oil pollution damage.141 48 countries sent 
delegates to participate, while six additional countries and various 
international organisations were present as observers.142 The 1969 CLC was 
the initial legislative response of the international community after the Torrey 
Canyon.143  
 
In 1978, the Amoco Cadiz prompted the international community to 
contemplate amendments to the 1969 regime. In response, an international 
conference was held in 1984 with the intention of adopting two protocols to 
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amend the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Convention.144 The entry into force of 
the 1984 protocols was, however, dependent on the participation of the 
United States of America (USA).145 The refusal of the USA to accept the 
international regime meant that these protocols never came into force.146 
Then, in 1989, the brisk stride of the Exxon Valdez obliterated everything in 
its path and polluted the pristine waters of Alaska.147 The Exxon Valdez was 
the largest oil spill in the USA, and it resulted in the USA’s unilaterally 
implementing its own regime which was stricter than the international 
regime.148 The Exxon Valdez tragedy, nevertheless, brought to light the 
conspicuous gaps in the existing international regime and the need for 
further amendments. This mandated a speedy response from the 
international community, and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
was forced to find another way to implement changes to the regime without 
USA participation. In 1992, after some procedural changes were made, the 
main content of the 1984 protocols were included in the 1992 protocols and 
implemented under the auspices of the IMO.149  
 
The 1969 CLC will be addressed here with a view to highlighting the 
way it differs from the 1992 CLC. This comparison will be done by 
addressing the conceptual elements of a functional civil liability regime which 
is the standard of care, scope of application, definition of damage, 
responsible person, available defences, liability limits, exclusion of limits, and 
insurance. The main features of the 1969 CLC and the 1992 CLC will be 
addressed under the headings of these elements. 
 
2.4.1 Standard of care: The chaotic debate 
 
It is firstly of importance to determine the necessity of having the 
element of a standard of care within a civil liability regime. A standard of care 
is necessary in order to have a uniform minimum standard against which 
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liability may be imposed and according to which certain standardized 
regulations may be enacted. The type of the activity which is being 
regulated, the nature of the damage or loss that may be caused and the 
importance of the protection against such damage are all factors which will 
have an effect on the standard of care to be imposed. 
 
To this end, article III (1) of the 1969 CLC provides that the owner of a 
ship at the time of an incident or, where the incident consists of a series of 
occurrences, at the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for any 
pollution damage caused by the ship as a result of the incident. Subject to 
certain exceptions, this article imposes strict liability on the shipowner.150 
The provision providing for strict liability was retained verbatim in the 1992 
CLC.151 
 
The imposition of strict liability on the shipowner is a departure from the 
traditional concept of fault-based liability which was the dominant liability 
system prior to the 1969 CLC.152 The debate on which form of liability should 
be applied within this regime was reported to be intense, as well as, the most 
time-consuming of all the matters discussed at the Brussels conference.153 
The fault-based liability system, however, had already proved to be 
inadequate.154 In consideration of the magnitude of the actual and potential 
environmental damage, the law existing at the time could not provide 
adequate compensation since it was severely restricted.155 Moreover, the 
tanker involved in an accident was not always at fault, and, besides that, 
proof of fault is extremely difficult to achieve in cases of oil pollution.156 In 
addition to the above, the concept of fault varies according to different legal 
systems, which in turn causes practical problems.157 The abovementioned 
factors, along with satisfactory reasons supporting strict liability, such as the 
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inherent risk involved in the activity of shipping, eventually lead to the 
removal of fault-based liability and the introduction of strict liability on the 
part of the shipowner.  
 
Another issue at the Brussels conference was whether strict liability 
should be placed on the shipowner or on the cargo itself (making the owner 
of the cargo responsible).158 Part of the argument in favour of strict liability 
on the cargo itself was as follows: Firstly, the risk was inherent in the cargo 
goods itself and not in the maritime transport of such goods; Secondly, the 
increase in the size of tankers was due to the increase in the demand within 
the oil industry, which in turn, resulted in these ‘industrial risks’ being taken 
and the oil industry  was ultimately the party who benefited from this 
process; Thirdly, the victims of oil pollution could not protect themselves from 
such industrial risks.159 The maritime states supported this approach 
because it would reduce the burden of costs on the shipping industry.  
 
The argument in favour of strict liability on the shipowner was as 
follows: Firstly, the risk of oil pollution is not solely created by the nature of 
goods but also by the carriage of such goods, i.e. maritime transport;160 
Secondly, although the oil cargo companies possess strong financial 
capacity, they could still avert claims by legal devices (e.g. the establishment 
of subsidiary companies to become insolvent), this being a major 
disadvantage inherent in the cargo liability system which could simply be 
avoided by making the shipowner liable;161 Thirdly, in order for a 
compensation system to be effective, there should be a good deterrent.. If 
liability were to rest on cargo interests, problems would arise when such 
cargo was under the complete control of the shipping crew on the high seas 
and an incident/casualty occurred.162 The only unit that would be in a 
position to prevent the casualty or reduce the damage it might cause would 
be the shipping crew, and they might not exercise their duty of care diligently 
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if there is no proper disincentive and if they are aware that full liability was on 
oil cargo interests.163  
 
All of the above concerns were expressed by various parties, and the 
competing interests at stake made it extremely difficult for the parties to 
reach a unanimous decision.164 At each round of votes at the Brussels 
conference, the first vote which took place on 14 November 1969 and the 
second vote which required a second preference from the delegates and 
took place on 17 November 1969, the parties’ decisions were divided, with 
no liability system being an obvious favourite. In an attempt to strike a 
compromise between the parties, the Belgian delegate proposed a 
compensation fund.165 This proposal was received differently by parties - 
some saw it as a way to overcome the difficulties associated with a specific 
liability system and a way to share responsibility, while others acknowledged 
it was a novel concept and should be approached with caution as a new 
system which requires additional study and exploration.166  
 
The chairperson at the Brussels conference then decided to split the 
final vote on 18 November 1969 in terms of the main questions to be 
decided, so whether liability should rest on the ship/cargo, whether there 
should be a shared responsibility and lastly the type of liability to be 
imposed.167 After the change of method in the final vote, three principal 
issues were decided: liability should be imposed on the ship/shipowner; a 
compensation fund should be established to provide for the sharing of 
responsibility between the shipping and the oil industry; and the form of 
liability chosen was strict liability with a slight majority.168 The success of the 
strict liability system in oil pollution cases since its implementation, as 
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compared to fault-based liability, indicates that, despite all the competing 
interests, the best possible option was chosen.169 
 
After the vote it was acknowledged that further studies would be needed to 
implement the compensation fund and, therefore, a working group to study 
the fund was decided upon by the parties.170 
 
2.4.2 Scope of application 
 
In order to determine when the 1969 CLC applies to a pollution claim, it 
is necessary to analyse the provisions concerning the scope of application. 
Before doing so, however, certain definitions are relevant in this respect and 
provide clarity on words used within the provisions defining the scope of 
application.171 These definitions include “ship”, “owner”, “pollution damage”, 
“oil” and “incident”;  only a certain few will, however, be discussed below.  
 
To begin with, the definition of “ship” is of great significance since 
article III creates the rule that the shipowner is liable for pollution damage 
caused by the “ship”.172 Accordingly, liability may ensue in terms of article III 
only if the polluting ship is covered under the definition provided in the 1969 
CLC.173 For purposes of the 1969 CLC, a “ship” is any sea-going vessel and 
seaborne craft actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo.174 This means it covers 
only laden oil tankers. It is argued that the 1969 CLC covers only oil tankers 
because it was intended to complement the proposed additional 
compensation fund which later came about in the 1971 Fund Convention, 
which is funded by the oil industry.175  
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Two questions then arise. Firstly, do combination carriers qualify as 
ships? Secondly, would mobile offshore units be regarded as ships?  
 
To answer the first question, it is suggested that the 1969 CLC will be 
applicable only if the combination carrier is carrying oil in cargo.176 The 
answer to the second question is, however, more complicated. It is obvious 
that these units will be excluded if they are not actually carrying oil as 
cargo.177 The ambiguity is, however, created with respect to the lack of a 
definition of ‘cargo’. Offshore units carrying oil for storage purposes may 
exclude the oil from being ‘cargo’ if cargo is defined according to trade and 
being transported from one place to another.178 In order to shed some light 
on this matter, Farahani turns to the French version of the convention. The 
French version states that oil should be loaded for the purpose of being 
transported, which supports a restrictive interpretation of ‘cargo’ and will thus 
exclude mobile offshore units from the 1969 CLC.179  The definition of ‘ship’  
was then extended in the 1992 CLC to account for the practical problems 
that were encountered with the 1969 definition.  
 
To account for its previous vagueness, the improved definition provides 
that a ship is any sea-going vessel or craft of any type whatsoever 
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil, which will  be regarded as a 
ship only when actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo (own emphasis).180 The 
words emphasised above indicate that even mobile offshore units can be 
regarded as ships if they are moving with oil in bulk as cargo. The definition 
goes even further and states that a ship is also regarded as such following 
any voyage of carriage of oil unless it can be proven that there is no residue 
of oil aboard.181 This means that the definition was extended to include 
unladen tankers and thus increasing the liability. One can anticipate that the 
proof of a ship having no residue of oil will be a difficult practical task.  
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The substance to which the 1969 CLC and 1992 CLC are applicable is 
restricted to oil. The definition of oil was expanded in the 1992 CLC by 
changing it from “any persistent oil...” to “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral 
oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether 
carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.”182 The 
expansion of and the specifications within the definition of oil will make it 
easier to determine when a particular incident is subject to the CLC and be 
of assistance in its practical implementation. 
 
 2.4.2.1 Geographical scope and environmental damage 
 
The environmental devastation caused by the Torrey Canyon disaster 
marked one of the first severe oil spills that the world has ever faced, and the 
response thereto was, at best, quite poor.183 Writers, such as Lee, have 
argued that no real efforts were made to assess the environmental damage 
and/or identify the best method to rectify it.184 These were the underlying 
circumstances in terms of which the 1969 CLC was created.  
 
This failure to allocate adequate attention to environmental damage, 
coupled with the competing interests of states, resulted in a highly restricted 
geographical scope. Article II provides that the 1969 CLC applies to pollution 
damage on the territory and territorial sea of a state, as well as, preventive 
measures taken to prevent or minimise such damage (own emphasis). The 
reference to preventive measures in this provision is vague but was 
ordinarily construed as being restricted to any measures taken in the territory 
of a state.  
 
Looking at this provision in retrospect, the obvious gap is that there is 
no mention of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a state since this zone 
was created in the UNCLOS only in 1982.185 It is trite knowledge that the 
UNCLOS is considered to have universal participation and, therefore, the 
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concept of the EEZ is of significance. The EEZ is a zone ranging up to 200 
nautical miles from a state’s baseline within which such state has sovereign 
rights of exploitation and conservation. The 1969 CLC preceded the 
UNCLOS and, therefore, its geographical scope was restricted to a 
contracting state’s territory and territorial sea. A much needed extension was 
brought about by the 1992 CLC to include pollution damage in a state’s EEZ 
or an equivalent designated area.186  
 
Important to note, is that, although the CLC regime is widely accepted, 
the USA refused to adopt the CLC and the CLC’s provisions do not apply to 
the waters of states who have not accepted the CLC. Consequently, oil spills 
in the waters of non-CLC states, such as the USA, remains uncovered or is 
subject to domestic laws.187 Evidently, in cases concerning environmental 
damage, the non-acceptance of the international regime will bring about 
certain practical challenges and, not only have economic consequences, but 
also, possible unregulated pollution damage. Since there can be no borders 
in the environment or sea, it is possible for the pollution damage to extend 
into states who have adopted the international regime, and yet they may not 
be able to hold the appropriate people accountable notwithstanding the fact 
that environmental damage is often irreversible and accountability is the only 
deterrent to avoid such damage from occurring. 
 
Finally, the geographical scope of preventive measures has been 
extended. Article II (b) of the 1992 CLC provides that it applies to “preventive 
measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimise such damage” (own 
emphasis). The emphasised words indicate that the 1992 CLC applies to 
any preventive measures taken anywhere, including outside a state’s 
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2.4.3 The definition of damage 
 
The definition of pollution damage is of great importance as the 
shipowner’s liability is dependent on what is considered to be pollution 
damage, and this will further clarify the scope of application (own 
emphasis).188 The 1969 CLC defines pollution damage as loss or damage 
caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the 
escape of oil, wherever such oil may escape, and includes costs of 
preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by such preventive 
measures.189  
 
Any legal provision which is not precise and does not clearly define its 
parameters is likely to encounter interpretation problems, as did this 
provision. The ambiguity of this definition lead to inconsistency in its 
application and caused controversy when deciding which claims are 
admissible against the owner and when exactly the owner is liable.190 As a 
means of illustration, personal injury and death seem to be too remote to find 
application in the definition of pollution damage. If, however, death or injury 
was caused by preventive measures, it could very well be the basis of a 
shipowner’s liability.191 In addition, there was considerable uncertainty as to 
whether, and to what extent, environmental damage may be claimed.192  
 
The definition of pollution damage was, therefore, amended in an 
attempt to clarify any uncertainties created by the previous definition. The 
following addition was made to the definition: “...provided that compensation 
for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit...shall be limited to 
costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken” (own emphasis).193 This was a poor attempt, as it does not 
provide any clarity about the extent of environmental damage that may be 
claimed. It creates a threshold by using the words “reasonable measures”, 
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but provides no guidance on what is to be considered a reasonable 
measure.  
 
One thing that was made clear by this amendment is that it is now very 
difficult for ‘pure environmental damage’ to find place in this definition. 
Although ‘pure environmental damage’ is not formally defined in any legal 
instruments, it is generally accepted in the International Environmental Law 
field to mean an impairment to the environment in a narrow or strict sense, 
which denotes damage to wildlife and other constituent parts and processes 
of the natural environment, rather than the inability to exploit damaged 
natural resources which causes economic losses194 and which is usually the 
focus in compensation systems.  
 
Indicatively, from an environmental perspective, the international civil 
liability regime falls short in the area of adequate compensation for damage 
to the marine environment. 
 
Despite this, with all of the competing interests and tensions at play, it 
is submitted that the international regime has managed to overcome these 
potential conflicts and provide common ground in terms of which, at least, 
the victims of oil pollution may be adequately compensated. 
 
2.4.4 Responsible Person 
 
 It is of high importance that the person or entity upon whom liability 
rests is clearly and unambiguously stated so as to allow for the proper 
implementation of all of the provisions set in place to achieve the objective of 
this regime being compensation for oil pollution damage. 
 
 Both the 1969 CLC and the 1992 CLC provide that the owner of a 
polluting ship is the responsible person in the case of oil pollution damage.195 
                                                          
194
 David Ong “The relationship between environmental damage and pollution” in 
Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law 2002 192 
195
 Article III (1) of the 1969 CLC; Article  
37 
 
Who then is the owner? The owner is the “person or persons registered as 
the owner of the ship or, in the absence of registration, the person or 
persons owning the ship.”196 In the case, however, of a ship owned by a 
State and operated by a company which is registered as the ship’s operator 
in that State, “owner” shall mean such a company.197 
 
 The 1969 CLC then provides that compensation against the owner may 
be claimed only in terms of the convention and, furthermore, no claims may 
be made against servants or agents of the owner.198 The 1992 CLC 
expanded on this and provided that, in addition to servants and agents, no 
claims may be made against members of the crew; the pilot or any other 
person who performs services for the ship; any charterer, manager or 
operator of the ship; any salvage operator; any person taking preventive 
measures; or the servants and agents of some of these excluded persons.199 
 
 Other persons or entities may also be responsible through the unique 
feature of the channelling of liability which is addressed below.  
 
2.4.5 The channelling of liability and compulsory insurance 
 
The realisation that there was a high potential of vast pollution damage 
that could be caused by oil spills resulted in the channelling of liability in two 
ways.200  
 
Firstly, both the 1969 CLC and 1992 CLC requires tanker owners to be 
adequately covered by insurance for oil pollution risks.201 In this respect, 
compulsory insurance to the amount of the prescribed limits is imposed on 
all tankers carrying over 2000 tonnes of oil in bulk as cargo.202 In the light of 
this requirement of compulsory insurance, the shipowner’s right to limit his 
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liability is imperative to ensure adequate insurance availability in the 
market.203  
 
Insurance cover for shipowners is provided by protection and indemnity 
(P & I) clubs.204 P & I clubs insure their shipowner-members on a mutual 
basis in terms of which each member is both an underwriter and the 
assured.205 The cover provided by P & I clubs generally provides for third 
party risk cover and oil pollution damage to the extent of the limits in the 
CLC.206 The requirement of compulsory insurance is attested to by a 
certificate issued by an authority in the contracting state once such authority 
is satisfied that adequate insurance or financial security is in place.207 The 
1992 CLC contains a measure of uniformity and flexibility by providing that 
contracting states are to accept insurance certificates issued by other 
contracting states as having the same force as certificates issued in their 
own state, even if such a ship is not registered in the certifying state.208 One 
disadvantage of compulsory insurance is that it does not cover oil spills from 
ships carrying less than 2000 tonnes of oil in cargo. 
 
Article VIII then introduces a prescription period within which all claims 
must be instituted. This provision provides for a prescription period of three 
years but may be extended to six years in the case of subsequent or delayed 
pollution.209 The wording of this provision has created some confusion but 
has been interpreted by courts to mean that the period of prescription runs 
from the first occurrence of the incident and ends after three years, but the 
supplementary three years may be used in the case of delayed pollution 
caused by the same incident i.e. the Prestige that sunk after its major oil spill 
was a cause for delayed pollution.210 
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Secondly, the other way in which there is a channelling of liability, is in 
terms of the 1971 Fund Convention which was introduced to provide 
additional compensation to victims of major oil pollution disasters.211 This 
substantial compensation is to be paid out of the fund where full or even 
adequate compensation was not possible out of the limited amounts 
contained in the 1969 CLC.212 The 1971 Fund Convention was an 
internationally motivated attempt to make the oil industry a contributor to 
making good the vast losses caused by an oil spill.213 Oil cargo interests 
make contributions to the fund. The fund covers compensation which is not 
covered by the 1969 CLC and the 1992 CLC, as well as, for damages in the 
case of an oil spill from a ship carrying less than 2000 tonnes of oil as this is 
not accounted for under the CLC.214 This cover from the fund compensates 
for the lack of such cover under the 1992 CLC. 
 
2.4.6 Available defences 
 
Article III (1) of the 1969 CLC and the 1992 CLC makes the shipowner 
strictly liable, subject to the exceptions/defences provided for in paragraph 2 
and 3. The liability of the shipowner will be excluded if the owner proves that 
the damage:  
 Resulted from an act of war, hostilities or civil war or a natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable character;215 
 Was wholly caused by an act or omission with intent to cause damage 
by a third party;216 
 Was wholly caused by the negligence or wrongful act of a government 
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.217 
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A possible inadequacy in the wording of this provision was highlighted 
in the Swedish case which involved the Soviet tanker, Tsesis, which struck a 
submerged rock in 1977.218 The shipowner sought to prove that the Swedish 
government was at fault for being negligent in its duty to maintain ‘other 
navigational aids’ by failing to represent such rock on a chart, which would 
allow the shipowner to escape liability.219 The Swedish Supreme Court 
eventually found in favour of the shipowner, but this decision has been 
criticised, and Hill argues that, had it been decided in accordance with 
English law, the case was likely to have seen a different outcome.220 
Nevertheless, this provision is yet another example of uncertainty within the 
1969 CLC which has been created by vague and ambiguous wording. 
 
Finally, article III (3) provides that, if the owner proves that the damage 
was caused wholly or partially either from an act or omission with intent to 
cause damage by the person who suffered such damage or from the 
negligence of such person, the owner may be fully or partially exonerated 
from liability. This is to avoid scandalous and unlawful acts for the mere 
purpose of the compensation payout. 
 
2.4.7 Limitation of liability 
 
 The limitation of liability is important to ensure the effectiveness and 
viability of the compensation system. Indefinite liability would most likely 
impose unrealistic burdens on shipowner’s, as well as, make insurance 
cover difficult, if not impossible. 
 
Article V of the 1969 CLC is one of the most significant provisions as it 
provides for the limitation of the shipowner’s liability by setting ‘liability 
ceilings’.221 In summary, the registered shipowner was entitled to limit his/her 
liability to 2000 (gold) francs per ship’s tonnage, provided that the aggregate 
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amount shall not exceed 210 million francs in any event.222 The currency 
was later changed from francs to special drawing rights (SDRs) and the 
amended provision allowed the owner to limit his liability to 133 SDRs per 
tonne and an aggregate amount not exceeding 14 million SDRs.223 The 
owner would, however, be disallowed from limiting his/her liability if the 
incident occurred owing to the actual fault or privity of the owner.224 An 
unfortunate problem for the victims of oil spills is that it is common cause that 
the fault of the owner is often very difficult to prove. 
 
The liability ceilings have always received the most attention and have 
been amended extensively as it is the feature that directly affects the amount 
paid out after an oil spill. The fact that these limitation amounts often fall 
short of total damages incurred after a major oil spill has led to them being 
criticised after catalytic events like the Exxon Valdez. The limitation amounts 
in article V of the 1992 CLC have, however, been raised to a much higher 
level than those in the 1969 CLC.225 This favour towards claimants is, 
however, balanced by the change in the standards by which the owner’s 
limitation rights may be deprived.226 The ‘actual fault or privity’ test from the 
1969 CLC was replaced by a stricter one.227 It now states that the shipowner 
is not entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the pollution damage 
resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with intent to cause 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result.228 This test makes it much more difficult for claimants to prove the 
above and thus deny the owner of his limitation rights.229  
 
In order to provide for these limitations, the 1992 CLC makes use of 
units of account which refers to Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as set by the 
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international monetary fund (IMF) which are to be converted into national 
currency on the date of the constitution of the fund.230 
 
The calculation of the aggregate amount of limitation per incident was 
as follows:  
(a) 3 million SDRs for a ship not exceeding 5 000 tonnes; and 
(b) for a ship in excess of 5 000 tonnes – 3 million SDRs together with 420 
SDRs for each additional tonne of its tonnage in excess of 5 000 
tonnes up to a maximum of 59.7 million SDRs.231 
 
The above amounts were then amended once again in October, 2000, 
and the amounts at present are: 
(a) 4 510 000 SDRs for a ship not exceeding 5 000 tonnes; and 
(b) for a ship in excess of 5 000 tonnes – 4 510 000 SDRs together with 
631 SDRs for each additional tonne of its tonnage in excess of 5 000 
tonnes up to a maximum of 89 770 000 SDRs.232 
 
As can be seen from the above trend, the limitation amounts have to 
be upgraded constantly to account for inflation and also to keep up with 
changing circumstances. An example of changing circumstances is the 
advancement of technology. Technological development is far more 
advanced today than it was in 1969 or even 1992 which could make it easier 
to detect certain environmental damage or easier to ascertain an accurate 
estimated amount of restoration which could not be done a few years ago. 
 
Lastly, it is important to note that liability was channelled more narrowly 
to the shipowner to avoid various claims being made outside the CLC as 
was the case with the Amoco Cadiz.233  
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2.5 Formalising the channelling of liability: the Fund Convention and its 
protocols 
 
The 1971 Fund Convention was updated by a protocol in 1992 and will, 
therefore, be discussed only minimally with the main focus in this part being 
the 1992 Fund Convention. Many of the general provisions of the 
conventions have, however, been left untouched and the discussion below 
should be construed as applicable to both conventions. Any changes or 
differences will be specifically pointed out. 
 
The preamble of the 1971 Fund convention acknowledges that the 
CLC is not sufficient on its own, and it aims to provide further adequate 
compensation to victims of oil pollution. It further expresses the view that 
“the economic consequences of oil pollution damage resulting from the 
escape or discharge of oil carried in bulk at sea by ships should not 
exclusively be borne by the shipping industry but should in part be borne by 
the oil cargo interests”.234 The aims set out in the 1992 Fund convention are 
on a par with these aims.235 The Fund was named the international oil 
pollution compensation fund (IOPC Fund) but the name was later amended 
to the “IOPC fund 1992” (the Fund).236 The Fund is a legal entity capable of 
suing and being sued in its own right, with the director of the fund being its 
legal representative.237 The scope of the 1971 Fund convention was limited 
to pollution damage caused and preventive measures taken on the territory 
and territorial sea of a contracting state.238 This was, however, extended by 
the 1992 Fund convention to include pollution damage in the EEZ or an 
equivalent designated area of not more than 200 nautical miles from the 
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2.5.1 Fundamental features of the fund 
 
The fund may be used for compensation for pollution damage in the 
following instances: 
(a) where no liability for the damage arises under the CLC; 
(b) where the shipowner is financially incapable of meeting his/her full 
obligations under the CLC in full, and any financial security that may 
be provided is insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation for 
the damage; and 
(c) where the damage exceeds the shipowner’s liability under the CLC.240 
 
Pollution damage includes expenses reasonably incurred by the owner 
to undertake voluntary preventive measures, and, therefore, this may be 
included in the compensation amount.241 The 1971 Fund convention allowed 
not only for compensation but also for indemnification to shipowners and 
their guarantors or insurers.242 The indemnification to shipowners and their 
guarantors was for a portion of the amount payable under the 1969 CLC in 
an attempt to relieve the “additional financial burden” imposed on them.243 
This was referred to as ‘roll-back relief’ and it is now purely of historical 
interest since it was completely abolished in the 1992 Fund convention.244 
 
 2.5.1.1 Contributions 
 
Contributions shall be made to the fund by any person from a 
contracting state who receives a total quantity of contributing oil which 
exceeds 150 000 tonnes.245 If the aggregate amount of such persons 
contributing oil, together with an associated person’s (i.e. subsidiary) oil, 
exceeds 150 000 tonnes then such persons shall make contributions.246 
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Contributing oil is crude oil and fuel oil, both of which are defined in article 1 
of the 1971 and 1992 Fund Conventions.247 
 
  2.5.1.2 Exceptions 
 
If the Fund proves that the pollution damage resulted from an act of 
war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection, or was caused by oil which  had 
escaped or been discharged from a warship or other ship owned or operated 
by a state and used only on government non-commercial service, then the 
Fund  would not incur obligations.248 In addition, no compensation would be 
paid where the claimant could not prove that the damage had resulted from 
an incident involving one or more ships.249 If the Fund proves that the 
pollution damage resulted entirely or partially either from an act or omission 
done with the intent to cause damage by the person who suffered the 
damage or from the negligence of that person, the fund may be exonerated 
wholly or partially from its obligation to pay compensation to such person.250 
There will, however, be no exoneration of the fund with regard to preventive 
measures.251 
 
  2.5.1.3 Limitations 
 
Article 4(4) of the 1971 Fund convention limited the fund’s obligation to 
450 million francs.252 It also, however, made provision for a higher amount 
should future circumstances justify it, and this amount should in any event 
not exceed 900 million francs.253 The 1971 Fund convention used the 
outdated currency of francs; the 1992 Fund convention followed the example 
of the 1992 CLC and adopted the currency of SDRs. In 1992 the fund was 
obliged to pay a maximum amount of 135 million SDRs, this amount being 
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inclusive of the amount incurred under the 1992 CLC.254 In October 2000, 
the IMO started to realise that this limit would need to be changed to account 
for inflation and other circumstances, and a resolution was adopted by the 
IMO which increased this limit to 203 000 000 SDRs.255 
 
As in the case of the CLC and its many protocols, as time passed, the 
circumstances called for an extra tier of compensation. This third-tier is 
provided in the 2003 protocol to amend the 1992 Fund convention (2003 
Supplementary Fund).256 The preamble of the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
notes that the maximum compensation provided for in the 1992 Fund 
convention might be insufficient in certain circumstances.257 It further 
believes that the 2003 Supplementary Fund should seek to ensure that 
victims of oil pollution damage are compensated in full for their loss or 
damage.258 As such, the compensation amount was increased in 
comparison to the 1992 Fund convention. It now holds that the total amount 
payable by the 2003 Supplementary Fund together with the amount 
recoverable from the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund convention must not exceed 




In general, the 1969 CLC was a revolutionary regime and a shift away 
from the old international position which was fraught with uncertainty and a 
lack of regulation. As time passed, however, its effectiveness was tested 
through its ability to handle subsequent oil spill incidents adequately. After 
some years, it became evident that certain changes had to be made to this 
regime. These changes were provided for in a protocol of amendment in 
1992 which was prompted by the Amoco Cadiz in 1978 and the Exxon 
Valdez in 1989. 
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 The standard of care adopted in this regime was strict liability which 
makes the responsible person automatically liable for oil pollution damage 
without proof of fault. This form of liability works particularly well in cases 
such as the present where the specific activity is risky and the substance 
concerned is inherently harmful to the environment. The imposition of strict 
liability was seen as an innovative measure at the time, and at present it is 
regarded as an effective tool as it also has the ability to encourage 
compliance with regulatory measures for ships in order to decrease the 
chances of oil spills and accidents. 
 
 The 1969 CLC applied only to unladen tankers and accidental damage 
within the territory and territorial sea of an affected state. The 1992 CLC, 
however, extended the scope of application to include damage caused within 
a state’s EEZ and to preventive measures taken anywhere, including the 
high seas. The substance covered by this regime is restricted to oil, and the 
definition of oil has been made more specific in the 1992 CLC to assist with 
the practical implementation of the regime. The 1969 CLC fell short of 
protection over a state’s EEZ since this zone was only created in the 
UNCLOS in 1982 and thus this was rectified in 1992. 
 
 The definition of pollution damage in the 1969 CLC was vague and 
created practical inconsistencies. The definition was then amended in the 
1992 CLC but it is still not free from fault. The 1992 CLC sought rectification 
of these inconsistencies and thus made it clear that pure environmental 
damage could not be claimed. However, the extent of environmental costs 
that may be claimed still remains unclear. 
 
 The responsible person in the case of oil pollution damage caused by 
ships is the shipowner and the strict liability of a shipowner may be excluded 
only in terms of the following defences - an unavoidable event occurred, if 
the accident was caused by the intent of a third party, or the accident was 




In order for the system to be economically operable, liability ceilings 
are used. These limits, however, often fall short of total damages and are 
among the features that have received the most attention owing to the 
constant need to increase them to account for inflation and other 
circumstances. This, in turn, puts the efficiency of liability ceilings in 
question. The liability ceilings may, however, be excluded if it is proven that 
pollution damage was caused by the shipowner’s intentional or reckless 
personal act or omission. 
 
Finally, the channelling of liability is a very important aspect of this 
regime. Compulsory insurance is imposed on all ships that carry more than 
2000 tonnes of oil. The risk of oil spills will increase with the amount of oil 
carried and, thus, a threshold has been set. Spills caused by ships carrying 
less than 2000 tonnes will be covered wholly or partially by the fund. The 
fund also covers cases in which the shipowner cannot fully compensate. The 
oil industry contributes to the fund to achieve this channelling of liability. The 
supplementary fund was added as the third tier to this regime. 
 
The international regime has managed to keep up to a certain extent 
with developments and changing circumstances through protocols of 
amendment which have primarily addressed problems that have arisen in 
practice. Save for the limitations posed on environmental damage and pure 
environmental damage, the regime adequately addresses compensation for 
economic loss to individuals and states. Whilst recognising that some 
improvement needs to be made with regard to recoverable environmental 
damage, it is also noted that, in order for this civil liability regime to continue 
working effectively, it cannot be over-excessive and the striking of a balance 





CHAPTER 3: A REVIEW OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CIVIL LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION REGIME GOVERNING OIL 
POLLUTION CAUSED BY SHIPS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As has been illustrated in the previous chapter, 1969 CLC and the 
1971 Fund convention formed the framework of the international regime 
governing oil pollution civil liability, which SA enacted into domestic law in 
1981 through the MPA. The aforementioned conventions were, however, 
amended by two protocols in 1992 that now constitute the ‘new’ international 
regime.260 SA subsequently acceded to the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund 
convention on 1 October 2005.261 The updated international regime was, 
however, domestically enacted only eight years later.262  This legal reform 
was brought about by: the Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability Convention) Act 
25 of 2013 (“MSCLC Act”); the Merchant Shipping (International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund) Act 24 of 2013 (“the IOPC Fund Act”); the Merchant 
Shipping (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) Administrations 
Act 35 of 2013 (“Administrations Act”); and the Merchant Shipping 
(International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) Contributions Act 36 of 2013 
(“Contributions Act”).   
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish what SA’s legal regime entails 
following the enactment of these laws. The MSCLC Act and the IOPC Fund 
Act will be analysed according to the same broad themes of a civil liability 
regime. A brief background is provided as a starting point. 
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Prior to the suite of statutes enacted to fulfil SA’s international 
obligations and domesticate the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund convention, civil 
liability for oil pollution damage in SA was primarily dealt with in the Marine 
Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 (MPCCLA). The relevance 
of the MPCCLA is the fact that it was not wholly repealed following the 
enactment of the new merchant shipping acts. In exploring SA’s existing 
regime, it is therefore necessary to address this and determine the practical 
effects thereof. 
 
3.3 The South African regime on civil liability for oil pollution 
 
 3.3.1 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 
 (‘MPCCLA’) 
 
The starting point is to state the object of the MPCCLA. The object is to 
protect the marine environment by providing for the prevention and 
combating of pollution of the sea by oil and other harmful substances and, 
furthermore, to provide for liability in certain respects of loss or damage 
caused by the discharge of oil from ships, tankers and offshore 
installations.263 The importance of specifying ships, tankers and installations 
is to differentiate this pollution from bunker oil pollution, which is commonly 
known as fuel oil or furnace oil of ships and is dealt with in terms of a 
different set of laws.264  
In addition, for the purposes of this section, the writer will refer only to ships, 
but it should be known that this term intends to include tankers and offshore 
installations. 
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The MPCCLA provides for both criminal and civil liability265 by creating 
a prohibition on the discharge of oil from any ship.266 If oil is discharged from 
a ship then the master of the ship, or, if he is not the owner, then he, 
together with the owner of such ship, shall be guilty of an offence.267 The 
type of liability created by this provision is strict liability.268 Strict liability in 
terms of criminal law is liability imposed by a statute without the necessity of 
proving criminal intent, and it is intended to forbid certain acts.269 There are 
three defences available to the owner or master facing criminal liability270, 
but these will not be discussed since the focus of this paper is civil liability. 
The MPCCLA makes provision for liability for loss, damage or costs 
caused by the discharge of oil.271 In this instance of civil liability, strict liability 
is imposed on the owner of the ship only at the time of the incident or at the 
time of the first occurrence of an incident that consists of a series of 
occurrences and not on the master of such ship.272 This section states that 
the owner shall be liable for any loss or damage which results in the republic: 
by pollution from oil discharge;273 the costs for any measures taken by the 
Authority for the purposes of reducing or preventing loss or damage caused 
as a result of the discharge of any oil;274 and any loss or damage caused by 
such measures taken.275 The ‘authority’ referred to in this section is the 
South African Maritime Safety Authority (‘SAMSA’).276  
 
As is foreseeable, Section 9(3) makes provision for three defences that 
may exclude an owner’s liability. This section states that the owner shall not 
be liable where the discharge or anticipated discharge of oil resulted from an 
act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or an exceptional, inevitable and 
                                                          
265
 Ibid 24. 
266
 S 2(1) of the MPCCLA. 
267
 Verwey (n264) (2005) 24. 
268
 Verwey (n264) (2005) 24 
269
 BusinessDictionary http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/strict-liability.html 
(accessed 08.05.2014). 
270
 Verwey (n264) (2005)  25; S 2(1)(a)-(c) of the MPCCLA. 
271
 S 9 of the MPCCLA. 
272
 Verwey (n264) (2005)  25; s 9(1) of the MPCCLA. 
273
 S 9(1)(a) of the MPCCLA. 
274
 S 9(1)(b) of the MPCCLA. 
275
 Verwey (n264) (2005)  25; s 9(1)(c) of the MPCCLA. 
276
 S 1(1) of the MPCCLA. 
52 
 
irresistible natural phenomenon277 or by an act or omission by any person, 
other than the owner or a servant/agent of the owner, with intent to cause 
damage,278 or was wholly caused by the negligence or wrongful act of any 
government or authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.279 
 
 The MPCCLA, furthermore, provides for the joint and several liability of 
an owner of a ship involved in an incident together with another ship, where 
the liability for the damage, loss or costs cannot be reasonably separated.280 
In addition, the MPCCLA allows for the limitation of an owner’s liability where 
he/she incurs liability as a result of an incident which occurred without such 
owner's actual fault or privity.281  
 
 Where an owner’s liability is subject to limitation, the aggregate of all 
amounts payable by such owner in respect of such liability shall not exceed 
the following:   
(i) in the case of a ship or a tanker, 133 units of account for each ton or 14 
million units of account, whichever is the lesser; and 
(ii) in the case of an offshore installation, a sum determined by the Minister 
but not exceeding 14 million units of account.282 
 
The MPCCLA clarifies that "unit of account" means a Special Drawing 
Right (SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund, and that the 
value of such SDR in South African currency shall be determined in terms of 
the valuation given by the International Monetary Fund at the time when 
payment is made, or at the time when a section 12(1) application is 
considered by the court.283 The current value of 1 SDR is the equivalent of 
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R16, 0659.284 So, in terms of the MPCCLA, a shipowner’s liability will be 
capped at R 2 136 per tonne or R 224 million rand, whichever is lesser.285  
 
It is common knowledge that the limitation amounts in terms of Section 
9(5) are insufficiently low and would not be able to cover or deal with major 
oil spills effectively, and, in such a case, the SA government would have to 
pay the remaining costs.286 The reason for this problem is that the MPCCLA 
uses amounts present in the 1969 CLC and does not take into account the 
1992 protocol.287 This is one problem that should be resolved in terms of the 
CLC Act 25 of 2013. 
 
The MPCCLA further requires shipowners to take out compulsory 
insurance against liability for loss, damage or costs.288 It provides that no 
tanker carrying more than 2 000 long tonnes of oil in bulk as cargo may enter 
or leave a port in the Republic, or arrive at or lease an offshore installation in 
the territorial waters, unless it carries on board a valid certificate stating that 
a contract of insurance or other financial security exists for an amount not 
less than an amount fixed in accordance with section 9(5).289 Section 9(5) 
provides liability ceilings as follows, 133 SDRs for each ton of tonnage or 14 
million SDRs, whichever is lesser. If a tanker is in contravention of these 
provisions, the master and the owner shall be guilty of an offence.290 So 
what essentially happens in practice is that shipowners can save on 
insurance costs owing to the fact that they can be insured for up to $500 
million but are statutorily obliged to much less.291  
 
Up to this point, the discussion has been about the ‘old’ SA regime 
governing the civil liability in marine oil pollution. It is clear that the MPCCLA 
was insufficient and outdated since it implements the 1969 CLC and was the 
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main piece of legislation governing oil pollution in SA even years after the 
international regime had been improved in terms of the 1992 CLC. Much 
needed reform was brought about to address this gap in 2013 which sought 
to give domestic effect to both, the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund 
Convention, and is examined here below. 
 
 3.3.2 The Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability Convention) Act, 2013 
 
Firstly, the object of this act is to enact the 1992 protocol of 
amendment (1992 CLC) into law and provide for matters connected 
therewith.292 Secondly, it is important to note that the MSCLC Act repeals 
sections 13, 14 and 15 of the MPCCLA which addresses compulsory 
insurance and authoritative certificates and replaces them with Sections 8 to 
14 of the MSCLC Act.293 The old MPCCLA and the new MSCLC act largely 
regulate similar issues; the MPCCLA is, however, not fully repealed. This 
means that there is a general overlap between the relevant acts which may 
cause potential conflict or uncertainty. It is presumed that the courts will 
allow the MSCLC Act to prevail since it gives effect to the most recent 
international regime.  The manner, in which the MSCLC act was enacted, 
however, is not ideal in the light of the potential uncertainty it creates.294 
Furthermore, the enacting of the 1992 protocol wholly into SA’s domestic law 
creates the risk of inserting inappropriate or problematic material into our 
legal system.295 Apart from these procedural issues, an analysis of the 
provisions of the 1992 protocol in conjunction with the substantive provisions 
contained in the MSCLC Act is needed to assess the changes to the South 
African regime. However, to avoid repetition of the discussion of the 
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 3.3.2.1 Standard of care 
 
 Since the 1992 CLC was incorporated wholly into South African law, 
the provisions imposing strict liability on the shipowner are applicable to the 
South African regime.296  
 
 3.3.2.2 Scope of application 
 
 The MSCLC Act follows the general structure of South African 
legislation, causing it to have introductory provisions relating to the 
application of the act. These provisions provide that the 1992 CLC has the 
“force of law in the republic” and is also applicable to the Prince Edward 
Islands which form part of South African territory.297 The Maritime Law 
Association of SA raised the issue that this wording is inappropriate to 
enactments intended to have extra-territorial application.298  
 
 Three things must be addressed in order to fully determine the scope 
of application, being the applicable activity, the substance covered, and the 
geographical scope.  
 
The activity to which the MSCLC Act applies is, broadly, the shipping of 
oil. Therefore, upon the escape or discharge of oil from such a ship, the 
MSCLC Act will become applicable.299  
 
The 1992 CLC is limited to oil as a polluting substance.300 The MSCLC 
Act is accordingly applicable if the oil causes pollution damage as defined in 
the 1992 CLC.  
 
Finally, the geographical scope of the act is somewhat confusing owing 
to the unfortunate wording used in the MSCLC Act. The MSCLC Act 
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constantly refers to ‘in the republic’;  the provisions in the 1992 CLC, 
however, provide that the convention is applicable to pollution damage in the 
territory, territorial sea and EEZ of a contracting state and to preventive 
measures, wherever they are taken (own emphasis).301 Since the 1992 CLC 
was enacted wholly into South African law, the MSCLC Act should apply in 
circumstances where preventive measures are taken beyond SA’s territory in 
an incident involving SA as a contracting state. This issue was, however, 
brought to the attention of the government by the Maritime Law Association 
of SA. The impractical wording was, nevertheless, retained in the final 
version of the MSCLC Act. 
 
 3.3.2.3 Definition of damage 
 
 As has been noted previously, the importance of a solid definition of 
pollution damage rests on the fact that the liability of the shipowner is 
dependent on what is considered to be pollution. 
 
 According to the 1992 CLC, “Pollution damage” means: 
 
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from 
the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to 
costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken; and 
 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.302 
 
 As noted in the previous chapter, costs for environmental damage were 
restricted when the definition of damage was amended in the 1992 Fund 
convention. This amended definition makes it clear that pure environmental 
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damage may not be claimed.  The extent of environmental costs that may be 
claimed is, however, still unclear.  
 
 By wholly enacting the 1992 CLC into SA law, the MSCLC Act fails to 
address these issues which have been problematic in the international 
context for many years. It is proposed in this dissertation that, since 
environmental damage is such an important aspect of this regime, this 
aspect could easily have been clarified in the MSCLC Act by the addition of 
the same standards and measures that are used in the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and/or other SA 
environmental acts. This would be in line with the approach adopted in 
UNCLOS which allows contracting states to adopt measures which are 
“stricter than generally accepted international standards”.303 Such provision 
would have made this regime stronger than it is from an environmental law 
perspective. 
 
 3.3.2.4 Responsible Person 
  
 The 1992 CLC provides that the owner of a polluting ship is the 
responsible person in the case of oil pollution damage.304 It further provides 
that the owner is the “person or persons registered as the owner of the ship 
or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons owning the ship.”305 
In the case, however, of a ship owned by a State, and operated by a 
company which is registered as the ship’s operator in that State, the owner 
shall mean such a company.306 
 
 In addition to this, no claim for compensation may be made against the 
servants and agents of the owner, members of the crew, the pilot or any 
other person who performs services for the ship, any charterer, manager or 
operator of the ship, any salvage operator, any person taking preventive 
                                                          
303
 Boyle (n123) (1985) 79.. 
304
 Article III (1) of the 1992 CLC.  
305





measures, and the servants and agents of some of these excluded 
persons.307 
 
 Other entities or persons may be indirectly responsible for oil pollution 
damage caused by ships, through the channelling of liability which facilitates 
this possibility. These are the entities which provide insurance cover to 
shipowners and are commonly known as protection and indemnity clubs 
(P&I clubs).308 
 
 3.3.2.5 Channelling of liability 
 
 3.3.2.5 (a) Compulsory Insurance 
 
 Article VII (1) of the 1992 CLC states that the owner of a ship 
registered in a contracting state and carrying more than 2000 tons of oil in 
bulk as cargo must maintain insurance or financial security to the amount of 
the limits prescribed in article V. For enforcement purposes, every ship 
entering or leaving SA must have on board an insurance certificate which 
contains the information specified in article VII of the 1992 CLC and which is 
issued by the appropriate authority.309 The authority for all ships registered in 
SA is SAMSA.310 Ships of non-contracting states must maintain the same 
level of insurance in order to avoid unfair advantage.311 Warships and 
government or state-owned ships are, however, exempt from compulsory 
insurance.312  
 
It is important to administer the requirement of compulsory insurance in 
a strict manner which imposes sanctions for non-compliance owing to the 
vast damage that an oil spill incident can cause.  A ship entering or leaving a 
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port or terminal in the republic, therefore, without an insurance certificate on 
board makes the master and owner guilty of an offence and liable, on 
conviction, to a fine not exceeding R250 000.313 If a South African registered 
ship attempts to do the same outside of the republic, its master and owner 
shall also be guilty and liable to a fine not exceeding R250 000.314 An 
exception to the above two offences is made in section 11(3) of the MSCLC 
Act which states that, if a valid insurance certificate is in place but is just not 
on board such ship, the fine shall not exceed R20 000. 
 
 Article VII (8) of the 1992 CLC allows a claim to be made directly 
against an insurer or financial security provider. In such a case, the 
defendant may avail himself of the defences that would have been available 
to the shipowner. The defendant may, furthermore, limit his liability in 
accordance with article V.315  
 
One of the downfalls of the provisions implementing compulsory 
insurance is that it does not affect ships carrying less than 2000 tonnes of 
oil. As we have seen, this gap is addressed by the 1992 Fund convention 
which provides for insurance claims that fall out of the scope of the 1992 
CLC.316 
 
 3.3.2.5 (b) The Merchant Shipping (International Oil Pollution 
 Compensation Fund) Act 24 of 2013 (“the IOPC Fund act”) 
 
The IOPC Fund Act adopts the same approach as the MSCLC Act by 
enacting the 1992 Fund convention wholly into SA law. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are three main instances in which the 
1992 Fund convention may be utilised. These instances are: compensation 
for pollution damage where no liability for the damage arises under the CLC; 
where the shipowner is financially incapable of meeting his full obligations 
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under the CLC or where any financial security that may be provided is 
insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation for the damage and thirdly, 
where the damage exceeds the shipowner’s liability under the CLC.317 
 
All contracting states that receive a total quantity of contributing oil 
which exceeds 150 000 tonnes shall make contributions to the Fund.318 
Contributing oil is crude oil and fuel oil, both of which are defined in article 1 
of the 1992 Fund convention as follows:319  
 
(a) “Crude Oil” means any liquid hydrocarbon mixture occurring naturally in the 
earth whether or not treated to render it suitable for transportation. It also 
includes crude oils from which certain distillate fractions have been removed 
(sometimes referred to as “topped crudes”) or to which certain distillate fractions 
have been added (sometimes referred to as “spiked” or “reconstituted” 
crudes).320 
 
(b) “Fuel Oil” means heavy distillates or residues from crude oil or blends of such 
materials intended for use as a fuel for the production of heat or power of a 
quality equivalent to the “American Society for Testing and Materials’ 
Specification for Number Four Fuel Oil (Designation D 396-69)”, or heavier.321 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, it is of great importance to have accurate and 
clear definitions in environmental matters since it is often a highly technical 
method that is used to expunge pollution damage. The abovementioned 
definitions are detailed and they contain clearly defined parameters which 
ensure less confusion and inconsistency as is the case with the definition of 
pollution damage in the 1992 CLC. 
 
 In section 5 of the IOPC Fund Act, the Fund is recognised as a juristic 
person who is represented by the director of the Fund. It should also be 
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noted that the scope of application of the 1992 Fund convention is the same 
as that of the 1992 CLC.322 
 
 There are, furthermore, three instances in which the Fund will incur no 
obligations: 
 If the pollution damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war 
or insurrection or was caused by oil which has escaped or been 
discharged from a warship or other ship owned or operated by a state 
and used only on government non-commercial service;323 
 If the claimant cannot prove that the damage resulted from an incident 
involving one or more ships;324 
 If the Fund proves that the pollution damage resulted entirely or 
partially either from an act or omission done with the intent to cause 
damage by the person who suffered the damage or from the 
negligence of that person, the fund may be exonerated wholly or 
partially from its obligation to pay compensation to such person.325 
There will, however, be no exoneration of the fund with regard to 
preventive measures.326 
 
 Finally, the Fund is also subject to limitation amounts to ensure its 
continuity. According to the Supplementary Fund protocol, which is the latest 
amendment to the 1992 Fund convention, the aggregate amount of 
compensation payable for any one incident shall be limited to 750 million 
SDRs together with the total compensation paid out in terms of the 1992 
CLC.327 
 
3.4 The Fund’s application in SA 
 
 The enactment of the international oil pollution compensation regime 
into domestic law is very recent and, as a result, literature regarding the 
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practical effect on the SA regime is limited. The writer has, therefore, 
resorted to making use of the minutes of committee meetings of the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP). According to a meeting held in October 2013, 
the fund is based in the United Kingdom (UK) and any claims against the 
fund are to be lodged in London.328 SA, furthermore, owes money to the fund 
due to the fact that SA was obliged internationally to start making 
contributions to the fund in 2005 upon ratification of the relevant convention 
yet no contributions were made by SA since 2005.329 Lastly, this meeting 
clarified that, while shipping companies are responsible for contributing 
levies to the fund, such money cannot be directly transferred without being 
accounted for and that, therefore, the South African Revenue Services 
(SARS) is to assist in the collection of monies and payment to the fund.330 
This process was facilitated by the Contributions Act which came into effect 
in 2013.  
 
 The Contributions Act provides that any person who receives more 
than 150 000 metric tons of contributing oil during the tax period is liable to 
pay levies to the Commissioner of SARS.331 ‘Contributing oil’ means crude 
oil and fuel oil, and the tax period refers to one calendar year.332 
 
 The minister is to determine, and publish in a government gazette 
notice, the rate of the levy for a particular tax period after taking into account:  
 
(a) The contributions calculated and invoiced by the director of the Fund in 
terms of article 12 of the 1992 Fund Convention in respect of the 
particular tax period; and 333 
 
(b) The volume of contributing oil imported in the tax period.334 
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 The Minister must, furthermore, specify the date on which the levy is 
due and payable.335 
 
 Finally, the government must pay to the Fund the amount of 
contributions invoiced by the director of the Fund, as well as interest on any 
unpaid amounts to the fund.336 The total amount owed to the fund is a direct 
charge against the national revenue fund, and the Commissioner of SARS is 
authorised to address matters relating thereto.337 
 
 This system created by the various acts which make up SA’s oil 
pollution regime seems logically sound and well thought out.  One must once 
again, however, reiterate that proper compliance and enforcement measures 
are needed to ensure that this system is efficient. 
 
3.5 Available defences 
 
The available defences to a shipowner in SA are exactly the same as 
those provided for in the international regime. For ease of reference, 
however, the applicable provisions are reproduced here. Article III (1) of the 
1969 CLC and the 1992 CLC makes the shipowner strictly liable, subject to 
the exceptions provided for in paragraph 2 and 3. The liability of the 
shipowner will be excluded if the owner proves that the damage:  
 
 Resulted from an act of war, hostilities or civil war or a natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable character;338 
 Was caused wholly by an act or omission with intent to cause damage 
by a third party;339 or 
 Was caused wholly by the negligence or wrongful act of a government 
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.340 
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A possible inadequacy in the wording of this provision was highlighted 
in the Swedish case which involved the Soviet tanker, Tsesis, which struck a 
submerged rock in 1977.341 The shipowner sought to prove that the Swedish 
government was at fault for being negligent in its duty to maintain ‘other 
navigational aids’ by failing to represent such rock on a chart which would 
have allowed the shipowner to escape liability.342 The Supreme Court of 
Sweden eventually found in favour of the shipowner, but there was a division 
of opinion in the Supreme Court which illustrates the difficulty of these 
issues.343 The conventions, furthermore, do not effectively address the 
liability of governmental authorities, and a shipowner’s liability will be 
determined according to right of recourse available in domestic laws.344 This, 
and the vague and ambiguous wording within the conventions, makes it 
almost impossible to ensure a uniform application of the international 
conventions. 
 
Finally, article III (3) provides that, if the owner proves that the damage 
was caused wholly or partially either from an act or omission with intent to 
cause damage by the person who suffered such damage, or from the 
negligence of such person, the owner may be fully or partially exonerated 
from liability. 
 
3.6 Limitation of liability 
 
 The shipowner’s right to limit his liability is one of the most 
controversial topics within the international oil pollution regime. Article V of 
the 1992 CLC stipulates limitation amounts in terms of which the shipowner 
may cap his liability. International trends, however, reveal that the limitation 
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amounts have constantly to be upgraded to account for inflation, as well as 
to keep up with changing circumstances.  
 
The limitation amounts refer to units of account. The 1992 CLC 
explains that units of account refer to SDRs as set by the international 
monetary fund (IMF) and they are to be converted into national currency on 
the date of the constitution of the fund.345 The calculation of the aggregate 
amount of limitation per incident was as follows:   
(c) 3 million SDRs for a ship not exceeding 5 000 tonnes 
(d) for a ship in excess of 5 000 tonnes, 3 million SDRs together with 420 
SDRs for each additional tonne of its tonnage in excess of 5 000 
tonnes up to a maximum of 59.7 million SDRs.346 
 
The above amounts were amended in a protocol once again in 
October, 2000. The amounts at present are: 
(c) 4 510 000 SDRs for a ship not exceeding 5 000 tonnes; and 
(d) for a ship in excess of 5 000 tonnes, 4 510 000 SDRs together with 631 
SDRs for each additional tonne of its tonnage in excess of 5 000 
tonnes up to a maximum of 89 770 000 SDRs.347 
   
 The uncertainty herein lies in the fact that the wording which was used 
when enacting the 1992 CLC into SA law does not allow for an automatic 
enactment of further protocols to the 1992 CLC. In order to determine 
whether or not SA is entitled to use the latest liability ceilings enacted in 
October of 2000, one will have to enquire whether it has been published in 
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 In the light of the fact that the conventions were enacted wholly into 
South African law, it would be repetitive of chapter two to comment on every 
component of the civil liability regime.  
 
 The scope of application of the South African civil liability regime for oil 
pollution brought about by the recent SA laws, should practically, not 
encounter any problems owing to the unfortunate wording used in the 
MSCLC Act. In the event of such problems, however, it is argued that the 
courts will give effect to the correct interpretation of the acts, that is in line 
with the international regime and the object of the acts. 
 
 The definition of ‘pollution damage’ could have been improved upon 
within SA’s regime instead of simply enacting it ‘as is’ into domestic law. In 
the light of the uncertainty the definition has created within the international 
regime, the writer suggests that SA should have amended this definition so 
as to include pure environmental damage and, therefore, provide a greater 
protection to the environment. Alternatively, this definition could have been 
merged with similar definitions as contained in NEMA so as to create some 
uniformity, even if only within the parameters of SA. 
 
 With regards to compulsory insurance, as well as the general 
application of the IOPC Fund Act, it is plausible to note that SA will need to 
ensure that the compliance and enforcement measures in place are effective 
and efficient. If one looks at the enforcement of environmental laws in SA in 
general, the picture created is that SA needs to do more to enforce the rules 
and regulations that are “paper perfect”. 
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CHAPTER 4: A CLOSER LOOK AT STATUTES 
OF GENERAL APPLICATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA, HOW THEY MAY ASSIST IN 




 The activity of maritime transportation is of an international nature and 
this justifies the necessity of having an international regime. Whether or not 
this regime is effective, however, depends on the implementation and co-
operation within the many participating states. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the great environmental threat posed by oil pollution, which surpasses 
human and geographical boundaries, mandated the need for a unified 
regime. In Chapter 3 we looked at new legislation which was enacted to 
bridge the gap in the South African civil liability regime. This chapter will 
address other South African legislation which indirectly forms part of the civil 
liability regime, by being generally applicable to environmental matters, with 
the purpose of ascertaining how this legislation may assist in improving the 
civil liability regime. Recommendations will be made where applicable and 
this dissertation will then come to a conclusion in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2 The South African Civil Liability Regime for Oil Pollution Damage 
Caused by Ships 
 The previous chapter focused solely on the four civil liability acts which 
were enacted in December 2013 to give effect to the international 
conventions which make up the international regime; however, it is important 
to note that there are other laws in SA which may have a bearing on SA’s 
civil liability regime and these are worth mentioning as a matter of relevance.   
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These are referred to as statutes of general application349, namely, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA) known as the “umbrella 
convention” for SA’s environmental laws; the South African Maritime Safety 
Authority Act 5 of 1998 (SAMSA Act); The Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994 
(MZA); The National Ports Act 12 of 2005 (NPA) and The Maritime Traffic 
Act 2 of 1981 (MTA). This is not an exhaustive list and the writer will only 
expand on the first three abovementioned statutes.  
 
 4.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 
 1996 (The Constitution) 
The Constitution is the highest and supreme law of SA, it is the founding 
document of SA and will thus always be of general application350 to any 
South African regime. The importance of this statute lies in the fact that it 
contains in it fundamental human rights which must be respected and 
protected. Section 24 of the Constitution is two-fold; Section 24(a) states that 
everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or 
well-being and secondly, Section 24(b) imposes a burden on the state to 
take legislative and other measures to: - 
“(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.”351 
 
The elevation of the environmental right to a justiciable constitutional right 
means, that in the context of oil pollution, the courts may decide whether oil 
pollution caused by a shipping incident is harmful to a person’s well being 
and whether the state to adequate measures to prevent pollution damage as 
required in Section 24(b).352 However, a lacuna exists due to there being no 
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specific mention of oil pollution in the Constitution and the courts never 
having deliberated this right in the context of oil pollution.  
It is recommended that the constitutional environmental right should be 
relied upon in a shipping incident case so as to allow the courts an 
opportunity to decide on the weight this right holds in the context of oil 
pollution and the extent to which it may be relied upon in the future. 
Furthermore, perhaps this right should have been mentioned in the preamble 
of the MSCLC Act to indicate its importance and it might be worthy of such 
provision being made in an amendment act. 
 
 4.2.2 The National Environmental Management Act 108 of 1997 
 (NEMA) – “The Umbrella Convention” 
 
NEMA is a framework environmental act which contains general and 
innovative provisions relating to environmental management in SA. As such, 
it contains provisions that would be useful in the implementation, 
enforcement and improvement of the civil liability regime for oil pollution 
damage.353  
 
One of the problem areas identified within SA’s oil pollution regime is the fact 
that the international conventions were enacted wholly into domestic law, 
without regard for any problems those provisions may have presented in an 
international context. One example would be the definition of oil pollution 
damage354 which was retained when this could have been an opportunity to 
improve on that definition and provide for pure environmental damage. 355 
 
NEMA broadly defines ‘Pollution’ as: “any change in the environment caused 
by - 
 (i) substances; 
 (ii) radioactive or other waves; or 
 (iii) noise, odours, dust or heat; 
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- emitted from any activity, including the storage or treatment of waste or 
substances, construction and the provision of services, whether engaged in 
by any person or an organ of state, where that change has an adverse effect 
on human health or well-being or on the composition, resilience and 
productivity of natural or managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to 
people, or will have such an effect in the future (own emphasis).”356  
 
The NEMA definition of “pollution” specifically makes provision for pure 
environmental damage to be accounted for as illustrated above. It is 
recommended that the MSCLC Act should be amended to include a more 
stringent definition of damage such as: 
 
 Proposed definition for “pollution damage” - 
“loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the 
escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge 
may occur, which includes compensation for the impairment of the 
environment by any adverse effect to the composition and resilience of 
natural or managed ecosystems, where such impairment shall be equal to 
the actual costs for restoration of the marine environment.” 
 
The above proposed definition then accounts for pure environmental 
damage, as well as, eliminates the uncertainty surrounding the international 
definition with relation to “reasonable measures of reinstatement actually 
undertaken or to be undertaken”. As mentioned in chapter 3357, there is 
nothing in international law which precludes a state from adopting stricter 
measures, only that a state’s laws cannot be less effective than generally 
accepted international rules.358 
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 4.2.3 The South African Maritime Safety Authority Act 5 of 1998 
 (SAMSA Act) 
 
The SAMSA Act was formed after the release of a report entitled ‘Safe 
Ships, Cleaner Seas’ by Lord Donaldson which contained recommendations 
which were described to be a wake-up call for industries concerned with the 
policing of sea routes and the pollution threats that states’ face.359 The act 
created the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) and lists the 
following as SAMSA’s objectives: 
 
 (a) to ensure safety of life and property at sea; 
 (b) to prevent and combat pollution of the marine environment by ships; 
 and  
 (c) to promote the Republic’s maritime interests.360 
 
This Act, in having one of its objectives the prevention and combating of 
pollution by ships, emphasises the importance of the role that SAMSA will 
play in the context of an oil pollution incident as there is a regulatory burden 
on them to generally regulate ships within SA marine and coastal waters to 
give effect to its objectives, as well as, the specific role they play by being 
referred to as the “Authority” in the recent civil liability legislation.361 
 
The writer recommends that SAMSA should actively embrace its role in the 
context of oil pollution and work together with all other involved state bodies 
such as the Department of Transport (DOT), Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), SARS and any subsequent bodies to compile a 
working document which harmonises the pollution laws pertaining to oil 
pollution damage, as well as, sets out a systematic and comprehensive plan 
on how to move forward in the implementation of the oil pollution laws. This 
document should furthermore address the issue of the outstanding amounts 
SA is owing to the Fund and formulate a method by which this can be paid 
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off as soon as possible to ensure that SA is practically covered should a 




 The legislation of SA which is indirect or which plays a ‘secondary’ role 
in the context of oil pollution still holds an important position within the South 
African Civil Liability regime. It has the ability to direct the courts when 
deciding on interpretation problems, it indirectly places more importance on 
pollution prevention and safety measures and it can be used as an example 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Research Question Answered 
 In Chapter 1, the following question was posed: Is SA’s civil liability 
regime consistent with, aligned with and adequate in light of, the 
international civil liability regime? The simple answer is yes. The South 
African regime is mostly consistent with the international regime since the 
enactment of the MSCLC Act, the IOPC Fund Act, the Contributions Act and 
the Administration Act in December 2013. However, whether this regime is 
adequate and effective is a slightly different state of affairs. The third chapter 
identifies the following problem areas present within the South African 
regime: 
 The unfortunate wording in the MSCLC Act pertaining to the scope of 
application of the act which makes specific reference to the Republic of SA 
and unnecessarily creates uncertainty due to the fact that the international 
conventions also apply to marine waters outside of a state’s territory;  
 
 The fact that the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund Conventions were 
enacted wholly into our domestic law with no regard for the interpretive and 
practical problems which were encountered in various international incidents 
when relying on the provisions of the 1992 protocols; 
 
 SA has not yet acceded to the Supplementary Fund Protocol which 
offers additional funds where the 1992 Fund is limiting or insufficient; 
 
 The definition of damage was preserved even though it is fraught with 
uncertainty in practice. Such an important part of the regime should have 
been updated to account for uncertainties and improve on the problems in 
the international regime itself. The definition and parameters of pollution 
damage forms the basis of liability for a ship owner and should thus be 




 Finally, and most critical of the problem areas, is the money which SA 
is owing to the international Fund. If payment is not made as soon as 
possible for the outstanding contributions, there might be difficulties and 
delays with claims lodged against the Fund in the event of an oil pollution 
incident. 
 Therefore the comprehensive answer to the abovementioned research 
question is two-fold; yes the South African regime is consistent with the 
international regime; and No it is not seen to be fully adequate in light thereof 
as the international Fund is not yet available to SA for lack of contributions 
over the years, as well as, failure to accede to the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
protocol by SA. 
 
5.2 The International Civil Liability Regime 
 The international regime  is made up of the framework convention 
UNCLOS, the 1992 CLC, the 1992 Fund Convention and the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol. Having regard for the history and 
development of the international regime which was prompted by various oil 
spill incidents such as the Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz and Exxon Valdez; 
this regime was revolutionary in many respects. It gave effect to the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle by placing liability on the ship owner, it kept up with changing 
circumstances through amending protocols and it adequately addresses 
compensation for economic loss to individuals and states. Whilst recognising 
that some improvement needs to be made with regard to recoverable 
environmental damage, it is also noted that, in order for this civil liability 
regime to continue working effectively, it cannot be over-excessive and the 
striking of a balance is of importance. 
 Chapter 2 addressed factors or elements which are necessary for the 
regime to be effective. These factors are:  
1. A standard of care which is necessary to ensure uniformity and 
standard regulations; 
2. A scope of application to determine the extent to which rules will be 
applicable in relation to an activity, substance and geographical boundary. 
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An important aspect of the scope in the international regime is the definition 
of ship which limited the regime to laden oil tankers; 
3. A definition of (pollution) damage which forms the basis of the civil 
liability/responsibility; 
4. Responsible person to clearly set out who is liable and against whom a 
claim may or may not be made; 
5. The channelling of liability to have in place secondary measures and 
sources should compensation not be possible initially through the 1992 CLC 
or the first branch of the system; 
6. Available defences to account for exceptional cases where there might 
be an incident which is caused by circumstances beyond any persons 
control; and 
7. Limitation of liability to ensure the viability of the compensation system, 
indefinite liability would most likely impose unrealistic burdens on 
shipowner’s, as well as, make insurance cover difficult, if not impossible. 
The simple fact that the international regime contains all these vital aspects, 
illustrates that it should work effectively and encounter minimal problems, 
however, practically the process is very different to paper and as shown in 
chapter 2, many procedural/interpretive issues may arise. Nevertheless, the 
international civil liability regime for oil pollution damage caused by ships is 
satisfactory and SA should take cognisance of its history and 
implementation. 
 
5.3 South African Civil Liability Regime 
 SA acceded to the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund convention on 1 
October 2005, however, these laws were only domesticated in December 
2013. A gap existed in the South African regime for 8 years, the implication 
being that any oil spill incidents during such time would be subject to the 
outdated international regime and subject to the liability ceilings of the 1969 
CLC. Practically this would mean that uncovered costs for pollution damage 
would have to be borne by the Government and the taxpayer and SA was in 
a vulnerable position.  
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 This loophole was finally addressed in 2013 with the enactment of the 
MSCLC Act, the IOPC Fund Act, the Contributions Act and the 
Administrations Act. As illustrated in Chapter 3, on paper, SA’s regime is 
now in line with the international regime save for not having acceded to the 
2003 Supplementary Protocol.  
 On the other hand, the practicalities of the South African regime need 
to be urgently addressed. In Chapter 4 the writer provides recommendations 
for the improvement of the South African regime, the most important one and 
worth re-mentioning here, is that the outstanding funds owed to the 
international fund must be addressed and paid off as soon as possible. 
SAMSA, SARS and other government bodies related to environmental 
management need to congregate and prepare a harmonised plan for the 
implementation and enforcement of the South African civil liability regime. 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, SA has taken a big step in the right direction by finally bridging 
the gap between the international regime and our domestic regime and 
continued enthusiasm is needed to improve the implementation of the 
regime. Furthermore, the international regime has developed from nothing 
into a revolutionary regime which is able to adequately address 
compensation to states and citizens which fall victim to oil pollution incidents. 
It is noted that there is still room for improvement in the international regime 
with regards to pure environmental damage and certainty regarding the 
extent of environmental costs which may be recoverable, however, this 
dissertation focused on the civil liability regime from an anthropocentric view 
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